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ABSTRACT 
 
 Research on the diffusion of strategic actions through board interlocks has 
mainly focused on the dyad level, meaning the one-on-one relations between a focal firm 
and its interlocked firm. The structural embeddedness of a firm and the characteristics of 
the interlocking director on the diffusion of strategic actions have received little 
scholarly attention. Drawing from a social network perspective, I first examine how 
duration of an interlock can influence the diffusion of strategic actions. In this 
dissertation, I specifically focus on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in emerging 
markets as the strategic action of interest.  
Next, I turn to the theory of triads in structural sociology and examine the 
influence of a closed triad. I theorize that Simmelian ties formed in a closed triad 
facilitate diffusion. I then propose the influence of the number of cliques in which both 
the focal firm and its interlocked firm are embedded. I also theorize how a sending 
board’s influence can increase the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets, whereas a 
receiving board’s access to information can decrease the diffusion. Finally, I explore the 
influence of interlocking directors. I specifically focus on the influence of the 
interlocking director’s position on either board (as a chair), tenure on the receiving 
board, and ownership in the focal firm.  
I tested my hypotheses with public firms from 2001 to 2012 and limited the 
emerging markets to BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). I found evidence 
in support of five of my hypotheses. My results show that the duration of an interlock, 
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the number of cliques in which embedded by both firms, the sending board’s influence, 
and whether an interlocking director is a chair on either board are positively associated 
with the focal firm’s implementation of M&As in emerging markets following the 
interlocked firm; whereas the receiving board’s access to information predicted the 
opposite direction. I then discuss the implications, opportunities for future research, and 
limitations of my dissertation. My main theoretical contributions are to extend social 
network theory and to provide a multi-level theory of board interlocks and the diffusion 
of strategic actions. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A board interlock is a tie created by two firms sharing a common director, and it 
has been an important topic in organizational studies (Burt, 1980; Mizruchi, 1996). 
Interlocks are considered as unique channels for the flow of information, where 
interlocking directors serve as carriers of information from one firm to other interlocked 
firms. Interlocks are also considered as a credible and relatively low-cost source for 
firms to manage environmental uncertainty (Useem, 1984). They help firms gain access 
to diverse and unique information (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Haunschild & 
Beckman, 1998) and learn new corporate practices (Davis, 1991; Palmer, Jennings, & 
Zhou, 1993). They can also serve as a signal of a firm’s quality (Certo, 2003; Kang, 
2008). Further, studies found that board interlocks are positively associated with a firm’s 
future performance (Horton, Millo, & Serafeim, 2012).   
 Diffusion is defined as the spread of a practice from one firm to another firm 
(Strang & Soule, 1998). A substantial body of the extant research on board interlocks 
has focused on the diffusion of strategic actions. Strategic actions are those that require a 
significant commitment and resources for firms. They are costly to implement, difficult 
to reverse, and involve very complex information (Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 
1991). Strategic actions are not those actions that are made for day-to-day operations. 
Those actions, also referred as tactical actions, require fewer resources and are easier to 
implement and reverse (Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991). Examples of a strategic 
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action include implementing mergers and acquisitions (M&As), changing organizational 
structures, and establishing of subsidiaries in a foreign country.  
Many scholars consider M&As in emerging markets a challenging strategic 
action and can often provide unique advantages for firms (Hoskisson, Short, & Yiu, 
2011; Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006). An emerging market is defined as a 
lower-income country with a fast-growing economic development and a favorable 
government policy towards a free-market establishment (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & 
Wright, 2000). M&As in emerging markets offer firms great opportunities because 
emerging markets have a tremendous market potential (Gaur, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2013; 
Yen, Chou, & Andre, 2013; Zhou, Park, & Ungson, 2013).  
According to the World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2012), more than 50 
percent of the global foreign direct investments (FDIs) went into emerging markets in 
2011. This shows that emerging markets have become increasingly important; many 
scholars found that firms implementing M&As in emerging markets are likely to make 
positive returns (Chari, Chen, & Dominguez, 2009; Ramakrishnan, 2008; Sethi & 
Krishnakumar, 2013). Even though M&As in emerging markets are considered an 
important strategic action for a firm, few scholars have examined the antecedents for this 
strategic action (Sethi & Krishnakumar, 2013). In particular, very few studies have 
examined the role of board interlocks on the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets 
(see an exception in Connelly, Johnson, Tihanyi, & Ellstrand’s 2011 study). 
The diffusion of strategic actions, such as M&As in emerging markets, is a 
natural setting for studies because scholars have been interested in the influence of board 
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interlocks (Mizruchi, 1996). Most scholars argued that because a director could advise 
executives on important strategic actions, s/he could have an influence on the diffusion 
of strategic actions. Studies have shown board interlocks diffused strategic actions such 
as poison pills (Strang & Soule, 1998), acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993), and 
diversification (Chen, Dyball, & Wright, 2009).  
In these prior studies, an important assumption regarding diffusion of strategic 
actions is that information is transferred from the interlocked firm to the focal firm via 
board interlocks. The information transferred is then assumed to turn into knowledge 
relevant to the subsequent implementation of the strategic actions (Shropshire, 2010). 
Thus, following the vast board interlock literature, I also assumed that the diffusion of 
strategic actions includes the transfer of information from the interlocked firm to the 
focal firm. The focal firm’s receipt of information is then turned into knowledge relevant 
to the implementation of the focal firm’s strategic actions. In this vein, how information 
turns into knowledge by the focal firm will be an interesting theoretical extension of my 
dissertation.  
While prior scholars have examined the influence of board interlocks through 
different theoretical lenses, social network perspectives, in particular, have been applied 
to understand the diffusion through board interlocks (Mizruchi, 1996). The core 
hypothesis of this stream of research is that firms embedded in the director network can 
leverage social relations and in return, facilitate economic exchanges, resulting in better 
firm performance (Granovetter, 1985). In this view, interlocks serve as a mechanism for 
firms to connect with one another. Firms that are embedded in the director network can 
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reap the benefits of social capital that are not available to firms outside of the network.
 Prior studies have significantly advanced our understanding of how board 
interlocks may facilitate the diffusion of strategic actions. The general consensus is that 
board interlocks can diffuse strategic actions, but they are not consistent predictors. This 
means that simply having an interlock between two firms does not always predict that a 
strategic action will diffuse from the interlocked firm to the focal firm. Hence, a research 
question remains as to when board interlocks facilitate diffusion. If we know a board 
interlock may facilitate diffusion but we do not know when, it gives us little assurance 
whether it matters (Mizruchi, 1996).  
A review of the literature reveals that the inconsistent findings on the effect of 
board interlocks may be due to the following: first, prior studies mostly considered board 
ties as homogeneous ties; they often overlooked the heterogeneous attributes of the ties. 
In other words, the strength of a tie is usually unnoticed (Shropshire, 2010). For 
instance, a tie that has existed for many years between two firms is viewed the same way 
as a tie that has only been established for a few months. Assuming every tie to be 
homogeneous is essentially ignoring the heterogeneous nature of the channels in which 
complex information can transfer from one firm to another firm; this may account for 
one of the reasons why some studies did not find the influence of board interlocks on 
diffusion. Thus, tie strength is often missing in existing studies.  
Second, extant studies have focused mainly on the direct relations between the 
focal firm and the interlocked firm. This means that most scholars have explored the 
one-on-one relations between a focal firm and its interlocked firm on the dyad level. A 
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firm’s structural embeddedness and its influence on the diffusion of strategic actions 
have received little scholarly attention (Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Park, 2011). Structural 
embeddedness is defined as the extent to which a firm is connected, directly or 
indirectly, to other firms in a network. In contrast, relational embeddedness refers to the 
direct relations between two firms (a dyad). Structural embeddedness can also reveal 
other connections of a dyad’s contacts because it includes indirect ties as well 
(Granovetter, 1992). Social network scholars have long called for using structural 
embeddedness as a foundation to understand a social phenomenon given that structural 
embeddedness can provide more contextual explanations (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 
1997).  
Finally, the characteristics of the interlocking director have been generally 
overlooked by diffusion studies (Shropshire, 2010). It is plausible that whether a 
strategic action may be diffused is dependent upon the carrier that transfers the 
information. Different interlocking directors may have different levels of influence 
depending on their characteristics. For instance, a chair of a board is more likely to have 
higher status than other board members. Thus, s/he is more likely to have more influence 
on the diffusion of the strategic action. To extend prior scholars’ work, more research is 
needed to explore the influence of interlocking directors.  
 In this dissertation, I address the limitations in the current literature (e.g., the 
strength of a tie and the structural embeddedness of a firm) from a multi-level 
perspective on board interlocks and the diffusion of strategic actions, specifically, 
M&As in emerging markets. As previously mentioned, emerging markets have gained 
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increasing importance because they offer many opportunities for firms. They have a fast-
growing economic development, and their governments also favor a free market system 
(Blitz, Pang, & Vliet, 2013; Du & Choi, 2010; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Hoskisson et 
al., 2000). However, M&As in emerging markets can be more risky due to the high level 
of uncertainty in those markets compared to developed markets (Kiymaz, 2013). 
Challenges such as underdeveloped markets and culture distance can hinder a firm from 
entering emerging markets (Ghemawat, 2001; Peng & Heath, 1996; Reus & Lamont, 
2009). Many times, firms may have to commit a substantial amount of resources when 
implementing M&As in emerging markets. Through board interlocks, firms may be able 
to learn from the interlocked firms that have already implemented the strategic action 
and thus, reduce the risk that the focal firm may face when entering the emerging market 
(Connelly et al., 2011). In essence, board interlocks can be an important mechanism for 
information to flow from an interlocked firm to the focal firm.  
From a social network perspective, strong ties are more likely to increase trust, 
exchange of information, and frequency of communications; thus they can enhance 
cohesion (Granovetter, 1985; Krackhardt, 1992; Simmel, 1950). All of which I argue can 
influence the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. I propose that tie strength 
influences the likelihood of diffusion at the dyad level. Diffusion is more likely when 
ties are stronger. I examine tie strength in terms of the duration of an interlock. I then 
examine the structural level factors that influence diffusion. I draw on the theory of 
triads in structural sociology and examine the influence of a closed triad (Simmel, 1950). 
I theorize that M&As in emerging markets are more likely to diffuse through Simmelian 
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ties due to the social cohesion developed in a closed triad. Simmelian ties are strong ties 
formed among three parties that are connected with one another (and thus, they formed a 
closed triad). The focal firm is also more likely to perceive the information as legitimate 
when it is in a closed triad with the interlocked firm. I then investigate the influence of 
the number of cliques in which both the focal firm and the interlocked firm are 
embedded. Cliques are tightly connected subgroups in a network. Cliques have long 
been studied in social networks (Luce & Perry, 1949) and have been considered as one 
of the most important sub-structures of a network that go beyond a dyad or a triad 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Research has shown that cliques can promote cohesion 
(Moody & White, 2003). Thus, I propose that firms in different cliques together are 
likely to interact with each other more frequently. Given that cliques can facilitate trust 
and cohesion, they can help the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets.  
Next, I theorize how a sending board’s influence and a receiving board’s access 
to information can increase or decrease the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. 
When a sending board has a higher influence, it is more likely to be viewed as a leader. 
Thus, the focal firm is more likely to follow. I specifically use Eigenvector centrality as 
the theoretical construct to capture the influence of the sending board. On the other hand, 
when a receiving board has more access to information, it is more likely to have received 
the information on M&As in emerging markets before the interlocked firm implemented 
them. Thus, a receiving board that has more access to information is less likely to follow 
the interlocked firm to implement M&As in emerging markets. The receiving board’s 
access to information is captured by closeness centrality.  
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Finally, I explore the influence of interlocking directors. I specifically focus on 
the influence of the interlocking directors’ position on either board (as a chair), tenure on 
the receiving board, and ownership in the focal firm. I argue that an interlocking 
director’s position signals status and influence, and thus as a chair, the information s/he 
brings back to the focal firm will be more valued. A longer tenured interlocking director 
on the receiving board also indicates that the interlocking director may be trusted more 
by the focal firm. Similarly, an interlocking director that has high ownership of the focal 
firm may have more influence over the focal firm.  I predict these characteristics will 
facilitate the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. The theoretical perspective 
developed in this dissertation suggests that strategic actions are influenced by factors at 
different levels rather than being diffused through a simple dyad level. 
 My main theoretical contributions are as follows: first, my dissertation extends 
social network theory by identifying a tie’s heterogeneous attributes. I go beyond the 
traditional recognition of strong and weak ties in existing literature and clearly identify 
the strength of a tie. In essence, my dissertation identifies strength of ties which is 
important in a board interlock network. Social network scholars have long called for the 
importance of identifying the strength of ties because they can more likely explain 
complex social phenomenon that are not easily explained by ties that are in simple 
categories (Borgatti, 2003). By identifying the strength of a tie, researchers can capture 
the complexity of the information transfer from the interlocked firm to the focal firm.  
Second, my dissertation further contributes to social network theory by taking 
into account the complexity of the network and the outcome of interest. Social network 
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scholars have not reached a consensus on how different centrality constructs influence 
the intended outcome (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). There has been a frequent debate on 
whether different centrality constructs capture different important social phenomenon. 
Most prior studies have simply use the direct ties that a firm has as a way to capture a 
firm’s centrality (degree centrality). By linking a sending board’s influence to its 
Eigenvector centrality and a receiving board’s access to information to its closeness 
centrality, I lay out the important linkage of contexts and a firm’s central positions. 
Specifically, I answer prior scholars’ call for social network scholars to consider the 
contexts when they build their theory on how diffusion occurs (Jones et al., 1997). Thus, 
I theoretically distinguish the various centrality constructs and empirically test their 
influence.     
 Third, in order to study a phenomenon involving individual and organizational 
levels, cross-level integrations of theory are important (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & 
Mathieu, 2007). In my dissertation, I provide a multi-level theory of board interlocks and 
the diffusion of strategic actions comprising ties created by interlocking directors, the 
structural positions of the focal firm and the interlocked firm, and the interlocking 
directors themselves. In this vein, I move beyond a simple dyad or triad level to consider 
the heterogeneity of the tie and the entire network. By examining different levels of 
factors, researchers can more fully model the diffusion of strategic actions.  
 Fourth, I contribute to the large body of literature on corporate governance, 
including board interlock research. I expand the knowledge on board interlocks from a 
social network perspective and move beyond the dominant agency theory. Agency 
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theory assumes that managers hold superior information relative to owners and focus on 
the asymmetry of information (Eisenhardt, 1989), but it offers limited explanation on 
how information may flow from one firm to another firm, resulting in a firm’s 
implementation of important strategic actions, following another firm. By shifting the 
focus from the asymmetry of information that is held by the managers and the owners to 
the transfer of information carried by board interlocks, this provides additional 
understanding of the diffusion of strategic actions.  
Further, I examine the influence of board interlocks from the dyad to the 
structural level that includes attributes of the interlocking director and the boards of the 
focal and the interlocked firm. Although some studies have investigated the influence of 
board interlocks from a triadic perspective (Mizruchi, 1992; Gulati and Westphal, 1999), 
they have not considered the strength of the ties and the larger structural level of the 
entire board interlock network. In particular, the theoretical perspectives developed from 
this dissertation suggest that board interlocks are most likely to diffuse strategic actions 
when tie strength is stronger and when the focal firm and interlocked firm are embedded 
in a closed triad and different cliques together. My dissertation also incorporates the 
characteristics of the interlocking director to show how they can influence diffusion. As 
a result, my dissertation develops a more structural and comprehensive perspective on 
interorganizational networks in the context of board interlocks. These theoretical 
perspectives may be applied in other interorganizational studies such as ties among 
executives (McDonald & Westphal, 2003).  
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Finally, I contribute to the literature on M&As in emerging markets. M&As in 
emerging markets can be a risky strategic action that has a potential reward to create 
value for a firm. I intend to identify what may influence a firm to implement M&As in 
emerging markets. Prior literature has mostly focused on the firm and industry 
characteristics and how they influence international expansion (Connelly et al., 2011). 
Through examining how board interlocks influence the implementation of M&As in 
emerging markets, my dissertation moves beyond the factors commonly (e.g. firm and 
industry characteristics) used by scholars to explain diffusion (Connelly et al., 2011; 
Jones et al., 1997). By identifying corporate governance mechanisms that facilitate 
M&As in emerging markets, we can help firms utilize their information channels more 
effectively (e.g., board interlocks).  
 In the following chapter, I review the literature on board interlocks and the 
diffusion of strategic actions. Specifically, I lay out M&As in emerging markets as a 
suitable context for this study. Next, I develop a framework on how social network 
perspectives and theory of triads influence the diffusion of strategic actions. From there, 
I present hypotheses for empirical tests and analyses. I then propose the effects of the 
characteristics of interlocking directors on diffusion. I define that a focal firm has a 
receiving board. The interlocked firm is a firm that has a sending board. The interlocked 
firm has to implement M&As in emerging markets before the focal firm so the strategic 
actions can potentially and possibly diffuse to the focal firm. 
 I tested my hypotheses with public firms listed in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
1500, Fortune 1000, and Russell 3000 index between 2001 and 2012 and limited the 
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emerging markets to BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). The results 
showed support for five of my hypotheses. I found that the longer the duration of an 
interlock between the focal firm and the interlocked firm, the more likely the focal firm 
will also implement the strategic action following the interlocked firm. Next, I found the 
greater number of cliques in which both the focal firm and the interlocked firm are 
embedded, the more likely that the focal firm will also implement M&As in emerging 
markets following the interlocked firm. Further, I found the sending board’s influence 
positively influences the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets whereas the receiving 
board’s access to information negatively influences the diffusion. Finally, I found that 
when the interlocking director is also a chair on either the receiving board or the sending 
board, the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets is more likely.  
Though I was able to show that M&As in emerging markets were likely to 
diffuse through the dyad and structural level, three of the hypotheses were not supported. 
I found that when the focal firm and the interlocked firm are embedded in a closed triad, 
it does not increase the likelihood of diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. Similarly, 
the interlocking director’s ownership in the focal firm is not statistically related to the 
diffusion. Finally, I predicted the interlocking director’s tenure is positively related with 
the diffusion. The result, however, was opposite of my prediction and was also 
statistically significant. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the results, 
implications, and future research as well as limitations.  
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 Board interlocks exist in many corporations and can facilitate the flow of 
information among the interlocked firms. Scholars have extensively examined the 
relations between board interlocks and the diffusion of strategic actions. In this chapter, I 
review the extant literature on the antecedents and outcome of board interlocks, and 
remaining research questions surfacing as a result of the scholarly work that has been 
completed. I then specifically focus on the diffusion of strategic actions.  
 
Board of Directors and Interlocks 
In the United States, all public corporations are required to have a board of 
directors. In some small or family firms, the board can be composed of its executives 
(e.g., the chief executive officers (CEO) and the top management team (TMT) members) 
or the family members; these individuals are referred to as inside directors. Outside 
directors are usually affiliated with entities outside of the firm. Most outside directors 
are executives of other firms. Both the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ 
require companies to have a majority of outside directors. According to the 2012 
Spencer Stuart Board Index (Stuart, 2012), from 2002 to 2012, outside directors on the 
S&P 500 boards increased moderately from 79% to 84%. The CEO was the only inside 
director on 59% of the S&P 500 boards, and 23% of the boards had an outside chairman 
in 2012. In 2012, the top four governance topics that directors focused on were: 
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executive compensation, the board’s role in corporate strategy, CEO succession, and 
director recruitment. The average size of boards remained roughly the same in 2012 
compared to 2002 (10.7 vs. 10.9) with 86% of the boards having 12 or fewer directors. 
The report also showed that active CEOs were taking on fewer boards, meaning more 
companies were recruiting their directors from among other corporate executives. As a 
result, more directors were serving on multiple boards. In 2012, outside directors had an 
average of 2.1 outside corporate board affiliations. Specifically, 35% of outside directors 
sat on one board, 32% on two, 21% on three, and finally, 12% on four or more boards.  
These statistics show the current board composition and the popularity of board 
interlocks. A board interlock is created when two firms share a common director (Burt, 
1980; Mizruchi, 1996). Interlocks can be created by inside or outside directors. For 
example, a firm’s inside director (e.g., the CEO) can serve on the board of another firm. 
Early studies indicated that interlocks were a result of corporate control, inter-corporate 
cohesion, and resource dependence (Mizruchi, 1980). Schoorman, Bazerman, and Atkin 
(1981) suggested that board interlocks were fairly common because they provided 
vertical coordination among suppliers and customers, expertise, and enhancement of the 
focal firm’s reputation. In this chapter, it is important to review all extant literatures on 
board interlocks. I first review the antecedents of interlocks, and then I review the 
outcomes of interlocks.  
 
The Antecedents of Interlocks from Different Perspectives 
 There can be many different antecedents of board interlocks. I review the extant  
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literature and discuss these antecedents from different perspectives, including from a 
firm’s perspective and from an interlocking director’s perspective. I limit my review 
below to a firm’s perspective and an interlocking director’s perspective because most 
articles cover these two perspectives. This is a comprehensive literature review from 
1979 to 2012. 
 
From a Firm’s Perspective 
Cooptation. One of the reasons for firms to form interlocks is to secure critical 
resources in order to minimize environmental uncertainty. Drawing on the classic study 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority (Selznick, 1949), Thompson and McEwen (1958) 
proposed that firms invited representatives from financial institutes onto their boards due 
to resource dependence (e.g., when a firm is heavily indebted to a bank). These are 
referred to as financial interlocks and have been discussed in many studies (Bunting, 
1976; Galaskiewicz, Wasserman, Rauschenbach, Bielefeld, & Mullaney, 1985; Lang & 
Lockhart, 1990; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Ornstein, 1984; Palmer, Friedland, & Singh, 
1986). Research in this stream concluded that although financial interlocks exist, their 
impact on a firm’s performance is inconclusive. 
In addition to financial interlocks, a firm can also interlock with other firms that 
control (or can provide) critical resources for the focal firm. Burt (1979) found that firms 
were more likely to interlock with firms in another industry in which the industry 
constrained their profits. He was also able to show that only firms that successfully 
interlocked with firms in the sectors on which they had dependency relationships could 
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obtain benefits from interlocks because the benefits were shown in their improved 
financial performance. Burt and his colleagues (Burt, Christman, & Kilburn, 1980) 
further confirmed that interlocks tended to exist when there were market constraints and 
tended to not occur in the absence of market constraints. Other studies also showed that 
resource dependence was an important factor in facilitating board interlocks (Ong, Wan, 
& Ong, 2003; Shrader, Hoffman, & Stearns, 1991).  
Monitoring. On the other hand, it is also possible that financial institutions send 
a representative onto a firm’s board in order to monitor the firm. In this situation, a 
financial interlock is formed (e.g., a bank sends a representative to sit on the lending 
firm’s board). Researchers have identified this type of corporate control in several 
studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Mizruchi, 1982). For instance, Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) 
found that financial institutions are more likely to send more representatives to sit on the 
focal firm’s board if the focal firm is experiencing declining solvency and profit rate. 
They also found that when the focal firm increases the demand for capital from the 
financial institute, this also increase the number of representatives sent from the financial 
institute to monitor the focal firm. In short, this stream of research suggests that financial 
institutions are more likely to form interlocks with firms that receive capital from them.  
Legitimacy. Some firms use their board of directors as a signal to the investors. 
When a firm appoints a director from a reputable corporation, it serves as a signal to 
investors about the quality of the firm. By associating itself with other firms that have 
the desired image, an interlocked firm can gain a spill-over effect on its image as well. In 
earlier work, scholars reported that boards were more likely to invite other high-status 
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CEOs to form interlocks (Galaskiewicz et al., 1985). Though not concerned specifically 
with board interlocks, current studies also confirmed that directors could serve as a 
signal of legitimacy (Certo, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2003). 
Individual Director’s Capital. Finally, it is plausible that a firm appoints a 
director because of his/her skills, experiences, and expertise. This can be due to the 
individual director, not due to other firms with which the outside director is affiliated. 
For example, studies have shown that new directors were usually drawn from a 
relatively small pool of people (Stokman, Van der Knoop, & Wasseur, 1988), meaning 
that these directors were more likely chosen for their individual characteristics, rather 
than the boards on which they were currently serving. In recent work, researchers found 
that complex firms (firms with more complex operations in terms of scale and scope) 
were more likely to attract new directors with high status; firms with high-status current 
board members were also more likely to attract new directors who also had high status 
(Johnson, Schnatterly, Bolton, & Tuggle, 2011). 
 
From an Interlocking Director’s Perspective  
Career Advancement. As interlocks are created by individuals, it is also possible 
that an individual joins multiple boards in order to advance his/her own career and 
extend his/her connections. Zajac (1988) found that individuals joined boards for several 
reasons including financial compensation, prestige, and contacts. According to the 2012 
Spencer Stuart Board Index (Stuart, 2012), directors in large corporations were well-
compensated, and they were more likely to secure another board appointment when their 
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current appointment ended. In summary, the more board appointments a person has (thus 
forming more interlocks), the more connections s/he has. These connections can become 
an interlocking director’s social capital and may advance his/her career (Hillman, 
Withers, & Collins, 2009).  
Social Cohesion. Finally, an alternative explanation of the antecedent of board 
interlocks is based on the social ties among the executives (e.g., the upper echelon). 
Researchers suggest that interlocks are an important way to reinforce elite cohesion 
(Domhoff, 1975; Zeitlin, 1974). Useem (1984) referred to this as an inner circle in which 
members were executives who sat on each other’s board and socialized in the same elite 
social clubs (e.g., belong to the same country club). Earlier studies showed that 
interlocks could be explained from an interorganizational and class perspective (Koenig 
& Gogel, 1981; Ornstein, 1984). This view is reconfirmed by studies that showed 
interlocks that were broken were usually not reconstituted between the same two firms 
(Palmer, 1983). Though the same evidence can show that directors are recruited for their 
skills and expertise, an in-depth look also shows that they are in an inner circle in which 
they socialize with one another. 
It is important to note that the antecedents discussed above are in no way 
mutually exclusive. It is possible that a director is recruited because of his/her expertise, 
and also because of his/her affiliation with another firm. This can also happen when that 
director is in the same social groups with the focal firm’s CEO. There are other factors 
that can motivate board interlocks that I did not review above. These factors include a 
firm’s history (Marquis, 2003; Mizruchi, Stearns, & Marquis, 2006), spatial 
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considerations (Kono, Palmer, Friedland, & Zafonte, 1998), and environmental 
uncertainty (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004). I include these articles in Table A-
1. Indeed, board interlocks reflect both interorganizational and interpersonal ties. 
 
The Outcomes of Interlocks 
 There are many potential reasons for forming a board interlock, but how does it 
affect organizational strategy and ultimately, organizational performance? As Mizruchi 
(1996; 280) put it, “If interlocks are to be worth studying, it is essential that they be 
shown to have consequences for the behavior of firms.” Researchers have been studying 
the behavioral consequences of board interlocks for many years. In general, researchers 
agreed that most times, interlocks served as a communication channel, rather than 
corporate control (Useem, 1984). This focus on communication channel reflects the 
nature of network embeddedness of the firms or the position of the firm related to other 
firms in the same network. For instance, a firm that has the largest number of board 
interlocks in the interlocking directorate network is usually the most central firm in the 
network. Network research mainly draws on the concepts of embeddedness and social 
exchange. Granovetter (1985) argued that economic behaviors were essentially socially 
embedded. Early scholars have used embeddedness to explain economic actions 
(Granovetter, 1985), and social exchange to explain how favors can be expected based 
on trust (Blau, 1968). In short, research concerned with interfirm networks suggest that 
organizational behaviors are influenced by the structure of the network and a firm’s 
position in the network (Ahuja, 2000; Azoulay, Repenning, & Zuckerman, 2010; 
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Marsden, 1981; Podolny, 1993). After reviewing the extant literature, the consequences 
of board interlocks can be summarized as follows.  
 
Manage Environmental Uncertainty 
Interlocking directors can add value to the firm especially in times of 
environmental uncertainty. For example, financial interlocks have been used as a way to 
secure financial resources.  Boyd (1990) found that firms facing higher environmental 
uncertainty performed better when they had more board interlocks. Hillman and her 
colleagues (Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999) also found that firms interlocked 
with the government could reduce uncertainty because of the access to superior 
information channels and the communication exchanges resulting from their use.     
 
Gain Access to Diverse and Unique Information 
Because interlocking directors sit on two or more boards, they have access to 
private information from other firms that is not otherwise available to the public 
(Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Thus, information on new corporate practices or policies can be transferred by board 
interlocks and they can lead to the diffusion of strategic actions (Davis, 1991; Palmer et 
al., 1993).       
 
Signal the Quality of the Firm 
An interlocking directorate also signals a firm’s quality by being affiliated with  
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another firm that has a good reputation (Certo, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Kang, 
2008). On the other hand, studies have also shown that “poor” reputations can be spilled 
over by interlocks as easily as can “good” reputations. For example, drawing on 
signalling and attribution theories, Kang (2008) found that firms interlocked with firms 
that were accused of financial reporting fraud were more likely to suffer reputational 
penalties.   
 
Influence on Firm Performance 
Different theories have been applied to explain the relationships between board 
interlocks and financial performance. Resource dependence theory has been the primary 
theory for the perspective that board interlocks are associated with better financial 
performance. The core thesis is that interlocks help organizations obtain needed 
resources and information as a foundation for improving their performance (Davis & 
Cobb, 2010; Pfeffer, 1983). In this vein, a board interlock is a measure of a firm’s ability 
to secure critical resources. For instance, Carpenter and Westphal (2001) showed that 
outside directors could contribute to the decision process if they were also on the boards 
of other firms in similar product markets and had similar corporate strategies. Board 
interlocks can also facilitate a firm’s borrowing (Mizruchi, 1996), alliance formation 
(Gulati & Westphal, 1999), and have been associated with effective capital acquisition 
(Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993).  
Social network perspectives have been applied in studies on board interlocks. 
Some researchers suggest that firms that are embedded in the director network can 
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leverage social relations and in return, facilitate economic exchanges, resulting in better 
firm performance (Granovetter, 1985). In this view, interlocks serve as a mechanism for 
firms to connect with one another. Firms that are embedded in the director network can 
reap the benefits of social capital that are not available to firms outside of the network. 
Studies have found that board interlocks were positively associated with a firm’s future 
performance (Horton et al., 2012). However, not all studies showed that board interlocks 
had a positive influence on firm performance. For instance, Fligstein and Brantley 
(1992) found that firms with fewer interlocks perform better than those with more 
interlocks. One plausible explanation is that firms in general will reduce their 
dependency by board interlocks when they are in troublesome environments (Burt. 
1983). Mizruchi (1996) also cautioned that this may be an issue of a causal order of the 
number of interlocks and firm performance. In brief, scholars have yet reached a 
consensus on the influence of board interlocks on financial performance. 
In summary, I provide a short review of published empirical articles on interlocks 
studies (see Table A-1). These articles are selected based on the relevance to the 
constructs I have reviewed; thus, they are ordered by antecedents and outcomes. These 
articles reveal several observations. First, at the firm level, most articles showed that 
cooptation was the antecedent for firms to form interlocks. Very few empirical papers 
focused on legitimacy, individual director’s capital, and monitoring as the antecedents. 
Second, while most empirical papers focused on strategy diffusion and firm performance 
as outcomes, there were also a variety of outcomes that scholars examined. For instance, 
Palmer (1983) found that multiple ties between two firms were more likely to facilitate 
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coordination than a single tie. Summarizing from these articles, we know that scholars 
have been very interested in board interlocks and especially on the outcomes.                            
 Further, I highlight the theories, the consistencies and the inconsistencies across 
studies in order to capture the richness and diversity shown by the results of the studies 
in Table A-1. At the firm level, the first antecedent to board interlocks reviewed in Table 
A-1 is cooptation. Resource dependence theory is the predominant theory used by 
scholars (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Shrader et al., 1991; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1986; 
Ong et al., 2003). Other theories used included structural theory of corporate cooptation 
(Burt, 1979; Burt, Christman, & Kilburn, 1980), social networks (Burt, 1980), and 
theory of finance control (Mintz & Schwartz, 1981). In general, researchers agreed that 
focal firms use board interlocks to work with firms that the focal firms depend on. Thus, 
ties to critical resources predicted better financial performance.  However, Galaskiewicz 
et al. (1985) found that firms do not form board interlocks for cooptation, but they use 
board interlocks to signal legitimacy of the firms. They found that firms are more likely 
to invite high-status executives on their board.  
 At the individual level, career advancement serves as an important antecedent to 
board interlocks as explained by social capital theory (Johnson et al., 2011) and social 
networks theory (Mizruchi, 1990). Researchers also show that social cohesion is an 
important motivation for board interlocks (Bohman, 2012; Koenig & Gogel, 1981; 
Ornstein, 1984; Yue, 2012). Different theories have been applied, including hegemony 
theory (Koenig & Gogel, 1981), organizational theories (Ornstein, 1984), contact theory 
(Yue, 2012), and social networks theory (Bohman, 2012). This stream of research agrees 
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that social cohesion is an important motivation for firms to form board interlocks. 
Furthermore, there are other factors that motivates board interlocks such as spatial 
consideration (Kono et al., 1998), imprinting theory (Marguis, 2003), history (Mizruchi, 
Stearns, & Marquis, 2006), and weak firm performance (Devos, Prevost, & 
Puthenpurackal, 2009). Researchers are able to show that other factors can motivate 
board interlocks. 
 For the outcomes of board interlocks, diffusion has been predominantly the 
outcome of interest. In this stream of research, scholars mainly applied institutional 
theory (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012; Sanders & 
Tuschke, 2007; Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001), social networks theory (Clawson & 
Neustadtl, 1989; Connelly et al., 2011; Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 1997; Galaskiewicz 
& Wasserman, 1989; Rao, Davis, & Ward, 2000), agency theory (Davis, 1991; 
Carpenter & Westphal, 2001), and resource dependence theory (Haunschild, 1993). 
Most studies show that when two firms are interlocked with each other, it is more likely 
that a strategic action will diffuse from the interlocked firm to the focal firm. However, 
some studies were able to show that it’s not just simply the ties that diffuse strategic 
actions, but ties to certain firms (e.g. Connelly et al., 2011). Davis and Greve (1997) also 
showed that not all strategic actions diffuse through board interlocks. For instance, they 
found that poison pills diffused through board interlocks but golden parachutes diffused 
through geographic proximity.  
 Another outcome frequently studied by scholars is firm performance. Resource 
dependence theory is the dominant theory in this stream of research (Boyd, 1990; Harris, 
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Shimizu, 2004; Sakar & Sakar, 1009; Phan, Lee, & Lau, 2003; Richardson, 1987; Yeo, 
Pochet, & Alcouffe, 2003). Scholars have also applied organizational theories (Keister, 
1998), upper echelons theory (Yeo, Pochet, & Alcouffe, 2003), agency theory (Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2006), social networks theory (Cai & Sevilir, 2012), and social capital theory 
(Horton, Milloo, & Serafeim, 2012). Some scholars found that board interlocks are 
positively related to firm performance (Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
Harris, Shimizu, 2004; Horton et al., 2012; Kiester, 1998; Phan et al., 2003; Pombo & 
Gutierrez, 2011; Yeo, Pochet, & Alcouffe, 2003 ), some found board interlocks are 
negatively related to firm performance (Fich & White, 2005), and yet some found there 
is no relationship between board interlocks and firm performance (Kiel & Nicholson, 
2006). Further, Sakar and Sakar (2009) found that interlocks formed by outside directors 
enhance the focal firm’s performance whereas interlocks formed by inside directors do 
not. 
 Finally, scholars are also interested in a variety of organizational outcomes from 
board interlocks. For instance, studies have examined how board interlocks influence 
similarity in political behaviors (Burris, 2005; Mizruchi & Koenig, 1988), alliance 
formation (Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Rosenkopf & Schleicher, 2008), CEO 
compensation (Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001), acquisitions (Beckman & 
Haunschild, 2002), strategic change (Haynes & Hillman, 2010), political unity (Dreiling 
& Darves, 2011), capabilities (Mahmood, Zhu, & Zajac, 2011), and choice of foreign 
capital market (Moore et al., 2012). 
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Criticisms of Board Interlocks 
Board interlocks, as expected, have been one of the most often used measures of 
interfirm networks. Researchers in general suggest that interlocks can influence a firm’s 
strategies, structures, and performance. Research on board interlocks gained increasing 
attentions in the 1970s and 1980s and remains popular in the present day. Despite its 
prominence, earlier studies provided only mixed support for its influence, and the topic 
is not without criticisms (Mizruchi, 1996). The basic criticisms are three types. First, 
some researchers argued that board interlocks failed to predict firm behaviors. Second, 
critics argued that interlocks did not capture the complexity and richness of the interfirm 
relations. Finally, even if the above criteria were met, interlocks did not necessarily 
predict financial performance.     
The first type of criticism is that interlocks failed to predict corporate behaviors 
(Stinchcombe, 1990; Zajac, 1988). Fligstein and Brantley (1992) found that financial 
interlocks did not predict corporate performance and claimed that researchers should not 
use interlocks to represent an inter-organizational network unless relevance could be 
theoretically specified. However, current studies as discussed previously showed that 
interlocks did sometimes predict the diffusion of strategic actions (see Table A-1), for 
instance, greenmail (Kosnik, 1987), golden parachutes (Wade, O'Reilly III, & 
Chandratat, 1990), multi-divisional form (Palmer et al., 1993), external financing 
(Mizruchi & Galaskiewicz, 1993), and corporate philanthropy (Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman, 1989).  
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While many studies showed a significant relation between interlocks and 
predicted firm behaviors, some studies did not find such a relationship. Allison and Potts 
(1999) argued that interlocks involved two sub-processes: contact and choice. A 
diffusion of strategic actions involves the transfer of information from the interlocked 
firm to the focal firm, and then the choice of implementing the strategic action (or not) 
by the focal firm. Many studies failed to differentiate the sub-processes, treating both 
contact and choice as a homogeneous process. This thus explains why some strategic 
actions diffuse while others do not. We can reasonably assume that information transfers 
via interlocks but we cannot always assume that the focal firm will decide to implement 
the strategic action. Shropshire (2010) proposed that the reason board interlocks fail to 
predict the diffusion of strategic action is that scholars have mainly treated all interlocks 
as homogeneous. She theorized that the interlocking director’s characteristics and the 
receiving board’s receptivity can determine the likelihood of diffusion. However, there 
are no empirical studies that support the claims.      
 The second criticism is that interlocks did not capture the complexity and 
richness of interfirm networks (Davis & Powell, 1992; Hirsch, 1982). Many researchers 
used board interlock network as the only measure to represent interfirm networks, 
overlooking other networks such as strategic alliance, CEO friendships, and common 
membership in the social groups/clubs. Because there are many ways a firm can connect 
with other firms, researchers should be aware that other ties exist. For instance, 
Westphal and his colleagues (Westphal, Boivie, & Chng, 2006) explored how top 
executives use informal ties (friendship ties) to top executives in other firms to manage 
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uncertainty and resource dependency. They found that broken ties (ties that are disrupted 
because of different reasons such as top executive resignations) are more likely to be 
reconstituted again especially when there is high resource dependence.  
Finally, the third criticism is that board interlocks failed to predict corporate 
financial performance. Many researchers propose that interlocks help firms secure 
resources and thus improve financial performance (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; 
Westphal et al., 2006). Based on resource dependence theory, a firm with more 
interlocks should have access to information otherwise not available to them. This is 
most likely to lead to a higher financial performance. Results have been inconsistent. 
Some found positive effects on financial performance (Pennings, 1980; Burt, 1983), 
while others found negative effects (Fligstein & Brantley, 1992). Mizruchi (1996) 
suggested that interlocks might be both a predictor and an outcome of firm performance; 
thus, the conflicting results were likely due to causal ordering.  
Some scholars found interlocks to be associated with reduced financial 
performance (Fligstein & Brantley, 1992; Meeusen & Cuyvers, 1985). One argument 
was that costs were associated with directors serving on multiple boards, and they were 
referred as busy directors (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999). The view was that busy 
directors had limited time and attention for the boards they served (Li & Ang, 2000). 
Researchers found that firms having outside directors with multiple directorships tended 
to have weaker governance (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). This view predicts that busy 
directors can have a negative influence on firm performance because busy directors 
cannot devote all their time and energy to help any single firm (Core et al., 1999; 
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Jiraporn, Singh, & Lee, 2009). Another argument was that an interlocking directorate 
embedded in the director network might become more committed to his/her elite 
network than to his/her boards (Burris, 1992). In this view, directors that were connected 
to different boards could be influenced by the norms and values of the network (Koenig 
& Gogel, 1981; Windolf & Beyer, 1996). This might lead to the tendency that the 
directors were more concerned with social cohesion than with their director duties.      
 While the last criticism cannot be answered unless there is a systematic analysis 
of prior studies (e.g., meta-analysis), my dissertation seeks to address the first two 
criticisms. I argue that board interlocks do transfer information from the interlocked firm 
to the focal firm. The information transferred is then converted into an understanding of 
the interlocked firm’s strategic actions that leads to the knowledge used for the 
subsequent implementation of the strategic actions by the focal firm (Shropshire, 2010). 
Thus, the transfer of information via board interlocks results in the diffusion of strategic 
actions. However, central to my theory is that not every board interlock results in the 
diffusion of strategic actions. Certain types of board interlocks generate different 
outcomes. In essence, I argue that interlocks do transfer information and diffuse strategic 
actions under certain conditions. I also further incorporate other factors that capture the 
complexity of the network. I review interlocks and the diffusion of strategic actions 
below. 
 
Board Interlocks and the Diffusion of Strategic Actions 
 Davis and Greve (1997) argued that interlocks provided conduits for information  
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flow and spread of norms of corporate governance. They suggested that it only made 
sense when a director sat on another board would bring the experiences from another 
board back to the focal firm. In this regard, directors serve as carriers of information 
from other firms. They help legitimize practices more directly and faster than outside 
public information. For instance, in the 1990s, AT&T and IBM both completed hostile 
takeovers (AT&T acquired NCR and IBM acquired Lotus). At that time, AT&T’s board 
was connected to 40 other corporations while IBM’s board was connected to 20 other 
corporations. Davis and Greve (1997) discussed that other firms that had board 
interlocks with AT&T and IBM could hear important information regarding advantages, 
disadvantages, costs, and benefits for hostile takeovers. This was important information 
that could only be transferred from the firms that had implemented the strategic actions 
to the firms that were connected to them (Becker, 1970). To the extent of the information 
that the interlocking directors can share and not violating the confidentiality clause, the 
interlocking directors can help the focal firm understand the strategic action. In other 
words, the focal firm could then see takeovers in a more positive way. In this vein, the 
information also helped legitimize the practices that were initially controversial. 
Scholars suggest that because director interlocks transfer knowledge about 
organizational practices (Davis, 1991), it explains why interlocked firms implement 
similar strategies (Haunschild, 1993; Westphal et al., 2001). When similar strategies are 
implemented by interlocked firms, this is generally viewed as diffusion. Strang and 
Soule (1998: 266) defined diffusion as “the spread of something within a social system.” 
As they explained, the key term is “spread,” and it indicates something (e.g., a practice) 
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flows from one to another. Diffusion also refers to contagion, embracing, and mimicry. I 
will now explain how board interlocks influence diffusion in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER III  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 When managers face an unfamiliar environment, they often have to make risky 
strategic decisions. Researchers have found that managers will observe other firms’ 
actions, collect information from peers, and learn from other firms’ successes and 
failures (Borgatti & Cross, 2003). There is a general agreement in the extant literature 
that managers frequently depend on their board interlock networks to collect information 
for strategic actions (Connelly et al., 2011). Board interlocks provide a mechanism for 
leaders of different firms to observe practices, exchange information, and receive first-
hand information on the process and outcome of strategic actions (Gulati & Westphal, 
1999). Thus, it is plausible that interlocking directors may influence the diffusion of 
strategic actions.  
As previously mentioned in the Introduction chapter, an important assumption 
regarding diffusion of strategic actions is that information is transferred from the 
interlocked firm to the focal firm and will then turn into knowledge relevant to the 
subsequent implementation of the strategic actions (Shropshire, 2010). In this 
dissertation, I examine the diffusion of strategic actions. Strategic actions are those that 
require a significant commitment and resources for firms. They are costly to implement, 
difficult to reverse, and involve very complex information (Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & 
Chen, 1991). They include actions such as acquisitions and strategic alliances (Miller & 
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Chen, 1994). Thus, I make a case for M&As in emerging markets as the focus of the 
strategic actions in this dissertation.  
A board interlock may be instrumental in the diffusion of strategic actions 
especially when strategic actions are complex and risky. An M&A in an emerging 
market is an example of a strategic action that involves a great amount of uncertainty. It 
is an important strategic action that can be highly rewarding but very risky (Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998).  Yet, few studies have examined the influence of board interlocks on 
M&As in emerging markets. One exception is Connelly et al.’s (2011) study on 
expansion into China. They found ties to firms that have successfully expanded into 
China increases the likelihood of the focal firm’s expansion into China while ties to 
firms that have unsuccessfully expanded into China decreases the likelihood of adoption. 
Because M&As in emerging markets involve highly complex strategies, it is very likely 
that managers will turn to their interlocked firms for information. In essence, complex 
strategic actions such as M&As in emerging markets are not a result of an isolated 
decision, but rather, they are most likely as a result of managers seeking information 
from other firms in the network (Connelly et al., 2011). 
Building on prior work, I seek to explain the diffusion of M&As in emerging 
markets from a more fine-grained and multi-level perspective. Based on the social 
network perspective, I first propose that the strength of a tie at the dyad level influences 
diffusion. I then incorporate theories from structural sociology to show how a closed 
triad and the number of cliques influence the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. A 
closed triad is formed when three firms are interlocked with one another, and a clique is 
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a tightly connected subgroup in a board interlock network. I further propose that a 
sending board’s influence (as captured by Eigenvector centrality) and a receiving 
board’s access to information (as captured by closeness centrality) can increase or 
decrease diffusion. I make a clear distinction among different centrality constructs based 
on their theoretical differences. Finally, I propose how the characteristics of the 
interlocking directors can influence the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. 
Throughout this dissertation, I denote the focal firm as having a receiving board, 
meaning the strategic action is being diffused to. The interlocked firm that diffuses 
M&As in emerging markets is referred to as having a sending board (e.g., diffusing the 
strategic action to the focal firm). 
  
The Case of M&As in Emerging Markets 
Many scholars consider diversification a challenging corporate-level strategy; as 
such, it remains one of the most influential and debated research topics (Bergh, 2001; 
Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Wan, Hoskisson, Short, & Yiu, 2011). M&As in 
emerging markets is a form of international diversification with the potential to provide 
unique advantages to firms (Hitt et al., 2006). As previously defined, an emerging 
market is a lower-income country with a fast-growing economic development and a 
favorable government policy towards a free-market establishment (Hoskisson et al., 
2000). Emerging markets offer firms tremendous market potential and cheaper labor 
costs. They are different from other developing markets because their governments also 
favor moving toward economic liberalization; this gives firms an added incentive to 
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expand into those markets. Although emerging markets offer new business 
opportunities, they also come with costs. Due to natural market imperfections in the 
emerging markets, firms face challenges such as an underdeveloped market structure 
(Peng & Heath, 1996), high cultural distances (Ghemawat, 2001; Reus & Lamont, 
2009), weak corporate governance (Khanna & Palepu,2000), a lack of public 
infrastructure, inconsistent government policies, and corruption (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008).  
Even though there are costs in doing business in emerging markets, they are 
becoming more attractive for firms in developed markets. According to the World 
Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2012), emerging markets accounted for more than half of 
the global foreign direct investments (FDIs) in 2011. This is likely due to the saturation 
of the developed markets and the growing opportunities provided by the emerging 
markets. Although emerging markets are becoming increasingly important, very few 
scholars have focused on M&As in emerging markets. For those scholars who have 
studied M&As in emerging markets, they have in general examined the relationship 
between M&As in emerging markets and firm performance.  
Some studies found that M&As in emerging markets negatively influenced a 
firm’s financial performance. Using firms in India as their sample, Mantravadi and 
Reddy (2008) found that only firms in the banking and finance industry reported 
marginal positive profits after implementing M&As; firms in most industries (e.g.,  
textile and chemicals) reported negative impacts. Kumar (2009) also found M&As had a 
negative influence on a firm’s performance in emerging markets. However, most studies 
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found M&As in emerging markets positively influence a firm’s performance. Collin 
(1990) investigated the return on investments in domestic, developed, and emerging 
markets. He found that international diversification provided a potential gain, but the 
gain was greater for emerging markets. Pawaskar (2001) studied 36 acquiring firms from 
1992 to 1995 and found that their M&As in India performed better than the industry 
average. Ramakrishnan’s (2008) also found that firms that have implemented M&As in 
India performed better, and his study was based on a sample of 87 M&As from 1996 to 
2002. Other scholars found that M&As in emerging markets increased the target firm’s 
return on assets by 16% five years after the M&A (Chari et al., 2009). Finally, Chari, 
Ouimet, and Tesar (2010) found that firms from developed markets reported a 
significant positive return after they implemented M&As in emerging markets.  
As shown in existing research, most scholars found that firms implementing 
M&As in emerging markets in general can earn positive returns. However, very few 
scholars investigated the antecedents of this strategic action (Sethi & Krishnakumar, 
2013). In particular, little research has focused specifically on the role of board 
interlocks in the decision to implement M&As in emerging markets (see an exception in 
Connelly et al.’s paper, 2011). It is surprising, given that one of the primary 
responsibilities for board of directors is to advise strategic actions such as M&As 
(Westphal et al., 2001). Because many scholars have shown that M&As in emerging 
markets are more likely to positively influence a firm’s performance, it becomes an 
interesting question as to what factors influence a firm to implement M&As in emerging 
markets. As previously reviewed, scholars have shown that board interlocks can 
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influence the diffusion of strategic actions but do not always predict diffusion. I see an 
opportunity to combine the two questions and answer the following: first, when do board 
interlocks matter? Second, do board interlocks facilitate the diffusion of M&As in 
emerging markets? 
 
Board Interlocks and the Diffusion of M&As in Emerging Markets 
Early studies on board interlocks have been dominated by resource dependence 
theorists (Borgatti & Foster, 2003). These scholars viewed board interlocks as a way for 
firms to secure and manage their resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1972) and 
maintain control and power (Palmer, 1983; Pennings, 1980; Useem, 1979). However, in 
recent years, researchers have shifted their focus to the information perspective of the 
function of board interlocks. They view interlocks as ways for firms to share information 
about effective practices and as paths through which strategic actions are diffused. These 
studies showed that interlocks helped diffuse strategic actions such as poison pills 
(Davis, 1991), M&As (Haunschild, 1993), and joint ventures (Gulati & Westphal, 1999). 
In this newly-developing stream, social network perspectives are frequently used to 
understand the influence of board interlocks (Davis, 1991; Mizruchi, 1996).  
 While there are many social network studies on board interlocks, I take a multi-
level approach in examining the influence of board interlocks on the diffusion of M&As 
in emerging markets. I investigate the influence of dyad and structural level of interlocks 
on diffusion and then discuss the influence of interlocking directors.  
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Dyad Level 
 Studies on board interlocks have in general focused on the dyad level. The 
underlying assumption is that interlocking directors are one of the primary channels for 
firms to connect with other firms, gaining critical information and improving 
responsiveness. In essence, board interlocks are ties through which information can 
flow. The flow of information is likely to play a key role in the process of the diffusion 
of M&As in emerging markets. Studies show that board interlocks help firms attenuate 
resource constraints and overcome environmental uncertainty (Casciaro & Piskorski, 
2005; Westphal et al., 2006).  
 
Duration of an Interlock 
Useem (1984) suggested that board interlocks could provide valuable 
information for executives to manage environmental uncertainty and to make their own 
strategic decisions. Other scholars also agreed that interlocking directors could transfer 
first-hand knowledge (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989). Thus, when an interlocked firm 
implements M&As in an emerging market, the focal firm is likely to be among one of 
the first informed. Several studies, however, showed contradictory results as to whether 
the information transferred facilitates diffusion (Mizruchi, 1996). Some studies found 
interlocks predicted strategy diffusion (Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993), while others did 
not (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Westphal & Stern, 2007). These inconsistent findings are 
likely due to the assumptions that most studies made. Most studies assumed that board 
interlocks are homogeneous ties (e.g., a tie is “a tie”) (Shropshire, 2010). Studies on 
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social networks have long distinguished strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973; 
Krackhardt, 1992), but studies on board interlocks have not distinguished different types 
of board interlocks. As previously reviewed, M&As in emerging markets can be risky. 
There are many uncertainties associated with emerging markets due to their market 
imperfection. The information transferred through a board interlock is likely to be valued 
more if it is through a strong tie. Thus, the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets may 
be influenced by the strength of (or lack thereof) board interlocks.  
Therefore, based on theories of strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973; 
Krackhardt, 1992), I propose that tie strength influences the diffusion of M&As in 
emerging markets. Specifically, it is the duration of a board interlock. In sociology, 
many scholars use duration as a common measurement of the strength of a friendship tie, 
but duration has not been widely used in organizational studies (Borgatti, 2003). My 
argument is based on the following: first, at the organizational level, when firms share a 
common director for a long time, they are more likely to build trust and reinforce 
cohesion. Because of the uncertain nature of the emerging market, the focal firm is not 
going to trust or value any information source. When a tie is a strong tie, the focal firm is 
more likely to trust the information source. It minimizes the perceived risks associated 
with M&As in emerging markets. Many scholars have identified the influence of trust 
and cohesion on the diffusion of innovation (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Davis, 
1991; Westphal et al., 2001). At the individual level, for managers, a director that has 
served as an interlocking director for ten years is more likely to be trusted than a director 
that has only served for ten months. Of course, this goes both ways. A director that is 
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more trustworthy and perceived as capable of his/her role is more likely to be kept on 
both boards for a longer time than a director that is perceived otherwise. Based on either 
argument, duration of interlocks is likely to reflect the degree and likelihood of how 
much a focal firm perceives the reliability of the interlocking director’s information from 
the interlocked firm.  
Second, because M&As in emerging markets involve managers making decisions 
in an environment that may not be familiar to the managers, board interlocks may 
facilitate communication and transfer of information between the focal firm and the 
interlocked firm. However, the frequency of communication between the focal firm and 
the interlocked firm is likely to be influenced by how long the interlock has existed. For 
instance, when two firms have established a tie through a board interlock for many 
years, the focal firm is more likely to communicate with the interlocked firm more 
frequently. After the interlocked firm has implemented M&As in emerging markets, the 
focal firm can communicate with the interlocked firm on the costs and the benefits of 
this strategic action. A tie that has existed for a longer period of time is likely to 
facilitate the communication and thus, the focal firm is more likely to see the value in 
M&As in emerging markets. In this vein, M&As in emerging markets are more likely to 
diffuse through a board interlock if the information is exchanged more frequently.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The longer the duration of an interlock between the focal firm 
and the interlocked firm, the greater the likelihood that the focal firm will also 
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implement M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm that has 
already implemented the strategic action. 
 
In short, I argue that a longer duration of an interlock enables trust and cohesion 
between two firms. The focal firm is more likely to perceive the information on M&As 
in emerging markets as reliable and more likely to communicate with the interlocked 
firm more frequently. This dyad-level characteristic reflects the degree of tie strength 
(e.g., a longer duration means the tie is stronger) that helps diffuse M&As in emerging 
markets. I then turn to the factors on the structural level that influence diffusion. 
 
Structural Level 
Network research mainly draws on the concepts of embeddedness and social 
exchange. Research on interfirm networks suggests that organizational behaviors are 
influenced by the structure of the network and a firm’s position in the network (Ahuja, 
2000; Azoulay et al., 2010; Marsden, 1981). A board interlock network is a natural 
setting for firms to exchange information and learn from each other. Information on 
M&As in emerging markets is potentially valuable because it is not as widely available 
as information on M&As in developed markets. As previously mentioned, extant studies 
have mainly focused on the relational embeddedness between a dyad. I have proposed 
that tie strength (in terms of relational embeddedness) facilitates the diffusion of M&As 
in emerging markets and will discuss the structural embeddedness below.  
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Closed Triad 
Going beyond the influence of a direct tie, the importance of third parties was 
first discussed by Simmel (1950). He argued that social exchanges involving three 
parties (triads) were fundamentally different from those involving two parties. It is not 
simply due to a higher number of participants (three vs. two), but rather, the interactions 
and dynamics among them (Krackhardt, 1999). Thus, studies in structural sociology not 
only recognize direct ties (dyad), but also consider indirect third-party ties (triads) (Burt 
& Knez, 1995; Gulati & Westphal, 1999). A closed triad is formed when three firms are 
connected with one another. This happens when Firm A is interlocked with Firm B, Firm 
B is interlocked with Firm C, and Firm C is interlocked with Firm A (see Figure A-1). A 
dyadic tie embedded in a triadic relation (i.e., a tie that is embedded in a closed triad) is 
also referred to as a Simmelian tie (Krackhardt, 1999), and Simmelian ties have been 
extensively studied in structural sociology (Heider, 1958; Kilduff & Krackhardt, 2008; 
Simmel, 1950).  
Krackhardt (1999) argued that the primary dynamics and transformation 
happened when actors moved from dyads to triads rather than from triads to a larger 
group. He showed that individuals in a closed triad were more likely to build support and 
establish trust. In essence, Simmelian ties formed in a closed triad can enhance social 
cohesion. Applying the theory of triads to organizational level, it is plausible that 
Simmelian ties can facilitate the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets.  
After the interlocked firm implements M&As in emerging markets, the focal firm 
that is in a closed triad with the interlocked firm is more likely to follow the strategic 
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action for the following reasons: first, when the focal firm is in a closed triad with the 
interlocked firm that has implemented M&As in emerging markets, the focal firm is 
more likely to receive direct information from the interlocked firm, and the information 
is likely to be reinforced again from the third firm that is also in the closed triad. Thus, 
the focal firm is likely to receive the information twice, once directly from the source, 
and once from an indirect source.  
Because M&As in emerging markets involve complex information and is costly 
to implement and reverse, a focal firm will be more likely to value the information more 
when it is transferred repeatedly from its interlocked firms. Second, because the 
information is transferred from two direct interlocked firms, it is more likely to be 
perceived as more accurate and legitimate. Legitimacy is an important factor for 
diffusion in a network (Human & Provan, 2000). A focal firm is only going to value the 
information if it is perceived as legitimate. This is especially critical when the focal firm 
is making a risky decision to implement M&As in emerging markets. Because 
information is not widely available in those markets, the information that is received 
from the interlock firms in a closed triad will be perceived as more legitimate and 
accurate. From there, the focal firm is more likely to consider M&As in emerging 
markets because of its interlocked firm, hence facilitating diffusion.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): When the focal firm and the interlocked firm are both 
embedded in a closed triad, the focal firm is more likely to implement M&As in 
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emerging markets following its interlocked firm that has already implemented the 
strategic action. 
 
Number of Cliques 
Scholars suggest that board interlocks transfer knowledge about organizational 
practices (Davis, 1991). This may explain why interlocked firms implement similar 
strategic actions (Haunschild, 1993; Westphal et al., 2001). The amount of information 
on M&As in emerging markets transferred from one firm to another firm is likely to vary 
dependent upon the level of structural embeddedness. Because the amount can vary, the 
likelihood of diffusion can vary as well. I have proposed that when firms are in a closed 
triad, the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets is more likely to occur.  
Taking it a step further, it is also often that both firms are in different cliques 
together. Cliques have long been studied in social networks (Luce & Perry, 1949). It is 
originally referred to as a subgroup that has at least three or more actors in which every 
actor is connected with one another (see Wasserman & Faust, 1994; I have also provided 
a more detailed discussion in Appendix B). A clique goes beyond a simple dyad or a 
triad and has been considered as an important sub-structure in a network (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994).  Scholars have found that cliques denote connectedness and reachability, 
which means, firms that are in a clique are more connected with one another and are also 
easier to reach one another. Thus, cliques can promote cohesion and influence (Moody 
& White, 2003). Cliques are sometimes used to signal the strength of ties between two 
firms (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
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 The effect of subgroups is an important aspect of network structure (Rowley, 
Greve, Rao, Baum, & Shipilov, 2005). For instance, if a focal firm and the interlocked 
firm are both in multiple cliques together, we may expect that they are more likely to 
have interactions with each other. Thus, when the interlocked firm implements M&As in 
emerging markets, the focal firm is more likely to hear about the information and 
interact with the interlocked firm. A clique goes beyond a simple dyad and triad. 
Coleman’s (1988) seminal work on social capital described how network closure can 
create cohesion and thus promote trust and social norms. In essence, a clique is also 
more likely to facilitate expectations, obligations among members, and information 
sharing within the network. Studies have found that cohesion promotes the longevity of 
alliances and joint ventures (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).  
In a board interlock network, the focal firm and the interlocked firm usually have 
only one direct tie (sharing one common director), but they can be in multiple cliques 
together. The number of cliques is likely to influence the diffusion of M&As in 
emerging markets for at least two reasons. First, when two firms are in multiple cliques 
together, this often suggests the firms have a higher frequency of communication with 
each other. Think of this as two people in different subgroups together; they are more 
likely to see each other and talk to each other. When an interlocked firm implements 
M&As in an emerging market, the information is more likely to be transferred to other 
interlocked firms. When the focal firm is in multiple cliques with the interlocked firm, 
the focal firm is more likely to receive the information through the interlock. Being in 
multiple cliques together also shows that information is likely to be transferred more 
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accurately, if not repeatedly to the focal firm. Because M&As in emerging markets are 
complex strategic actions that can generate a potential reward for the firm, more 
communication gives the focal firm more opportunities to learn from the interlocked 
firm, and hence, it facilitates the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets 
Second, when a focal firm and the interlocked firm are both embedded in 
different cliques together, they are more likely to build trust and cohesion (Coleman, 
1988). This is a similar idea as to what a closed triad can facilitate, but it goes beyond a 
triad. Although it is possible that a focal firm may trust the interlocked firm less when 
the focal firms knows more about the interlocked firm, research in general has shown 
that people develop more trust when they know someone more (Granovetter, 1973; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Thus, this is likely to apply for firms as well. As noted 
previously, because M&As in emerging markets require undertaking major risks with 
uncertainty, the focal firm is not going to implement M&As in emerging markets 
without considering the information source. Because cliques are likely to facilitate 
information sharing and trust between the focal firm and the interlocked firm, the focal 
firm is more likely to adopt the interlocked firm’s strategic action to implement M&As 
in emerging markets. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The greater the number of cliques embedded between the 
focal firm and the interlocked firm, the greater the likelihood that the focal firm 
will also implement M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm 
that has already implemented the strategic action. 
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Sending Board’s Influence 
Many scholars recognize the importance of centrality, which is defined as the 
position of an actor in a network that is involved with many ties (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994). Centrality has been linked to several important organizational outcomes because 
of the following reasons: first, a more central board has more access to resources 
because it is well-connected to other boards. Second, a more central board is more likely 
to receive new information before other peripheral boards. Third, centrality is usually 
associated with higher status and power, which is an important factor in predicting the 
ability to influence strategy (Finkelstein, 1992). 
 When a sending board occupies a network position that is more central, it means 
that the sending board is well-connected and carries more status and power (Kliduff & 
Brass, 2010). Thus, a receiving board is more likely to consider the information coming 
from a more central board. In this vein, centrality indicates influence. Although research 
has shown that most firms implementing M&As in emerging markets have generated 
positive profits, there are still many risks associated with emerging markets. Problems 
such as cultural distance and an underdeveloped market system can hinder firms from 
going into emerging markets. However, when the sending board occupies a position of 
influence, the focal firm is more likely to follow the interlocked firm’s actions for the 
following reasons: first, when the sending board is more central, it is perceived to have 
more access to resources. Thus, when the interlocked firm decides to implement M&As 
in emerging markets, it is perceived that it has utilized its resources to make this 
decision. It is assumed that a more central interlocked firm will always try to make the 
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best decision given its access to resources. In this vein, the focal firm is more likely to 
view M&As in emerging markets as a potential opportunity for firms to improve 
performance because it has been implemented by the interlocked firm that occupies a 
more central position in the network.  
Second, because a more central sending board is usually associated with higher 
status, this usually comes with power and influence (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Thus, 
the interlocked firm is most likely to be viewed as leaders. Extant literature has shown 
that firms are likely to follow the leaders into a new market (Haveman, 1993). Given that 
a more central firm is more likely to be viewed as a leader of the network, its decision to 
implement M&As in emerging markets will likely be followed. In other words, when the 
interlocked firm decides to implement M&As in emerging markets, the focal firm is 
most likely to perceive the leader’s action as positive and thus follow the leader.    
 However, it is important to distinguish the central position of influence of the 
sending board from the general definition of centrality (e.g., degree centrality that takes 
account of the number of direct ties that the focal firm has). There are four frequently 
cited centrality constructs in the literature: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, 
closeness centrality, and Eigenvector centrality (see a more detailed discussion in 
Appendix C). Degree centrality is defined as above (e.g., Firm A has five direct 
interlocked firms). Betweenness centrality captures how many times other firms have to 
go through the focal firm in order to reach other firms (e.g., in order for information to 
flow through the shortest path, five firms has to go through Firm B). Closeness centrality 
captures the shortest distance to all other firms in the network (e.g., if Firm C has a 
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closeness centrality of 1, it means that it can reach other firms within one step in the 
network). Finally, Eigenvector centrality takes other interlocked firms’ centralities into 
consideration (e.g., connecting to a more central firm gives Firm D more weight than 
connecting to a less central firm).  
Here, a sending board’s influence is captured by Eigenvector centrality. Early 
scholars have shown through experiments and simulation studies that not all centrality 
constructs can capture the influence (Bonacich, 1987; Bonacich, 2007; Cook, Emerson, 
Gillmore, & Yamagishi, 1983). For instance, a board interlock with Google (that has 
many board interlocks with other more central firms) should be weighted more than a 
board interlock with a firm with a less central position. Thus, connecting to more central 
firms has more value than connecting to less central firms. In this vein, Eigenvector 
centrality indicates the influence from the sending board. A sending board that has a 
high Eigenvector centrality is likely to facilitate the diffusion of M&As in emerging 
markets. The receiving board is more likely to be influenced by the information provided 
by the sending board that is perceived to be the leader of the network. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The greater the influence of the sending board of the 
interlocked firm, the greater the likelihood that the focal firm will also implement 
M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm that has already 
implemented the strategic action. 
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Receiving Board’s Access to Information 
Board centrality reflects the connectedness and the position of the board in the 
interfirm network. A more central position shows that a board has many connections and 
indicates not only higher status and power, but also more access to private information. 
As discussed previously, there are different centrality constructs, each representing 
different underlying theoretical assumptions. Because the sending board is not the only 
source of information about M&As in emerging markets, it is possible that the higher 
number of other sources (e.g., other interlocks) that a receiving board has, the lower the 
influence of the sending board of the interlocked firm. When the receiving board has 
more access to information in the network, it is more likely to have gained critical 
information on M&As in emerging markets from other firms. This is consistent with the 
idea of information substitution (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998).  
In order for the receiving board to obtain information, it should be close to other 
firms in the network. Thus, a firm that has the shortest path to other firms indicates that 
the firm has access to the most available amount of information in the network. 
Closeness centrality represents the shortest path to other firms in the network 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). When the interlocked firm implements M&As in emerging 
markets, the focal firm that has more access to information is less likely to follow the 
strategic action for the following reasons: first, although interlocks often provide inside 
information for the focal firm, a receiving board is only likely to value and be influenced 
by a source if the information is unique and critical. When a receiving board has 
alternate channels of the information (e.g., other interlocks), the influence of any 
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individual sending board is diminished. For instance, a focal firm that has a receiving 
board with high access to information is likely to have learned about M&As in emerging 
markets before its interlocked firm implements M&As in emerging markets. In other 
words, having high access to information gives the focal firm an advantage in receiving 
critical information before most of the other firms. Thus, the interlocked firm is not 
likely to have an influence on the focal firm because the focal firm can gather 
information from other interlocked firms. In this vein, the diffusion of the M&As in 
emerging markets from the interlocked firm to the focal firm is diminished.  
Second, because a receiving board has more access to multiple sources of 
information, it is more likely to search for a satisfactory answer (Haunschild & 
Beckman, 1998). This is called satisficing, meaning that the focal firm will continue to 
search its available sources until a satisfactory answer is found. Thus, a receiving board 
that has high access to information is less likely to be influenced by any individual 
source. When the interlocked firm implements M&As in emerging markets, the focal 
firm that has high access to information will likely search for more information 
regarding this strategic action. Thus, it is less likely to simply follow the interlocked 
firm. In short, the impact of information on M&As in emerging markets obtained from 
the sending board should be diminished in the presence of other sources. In this vein, the 
sending board’s influence is not as strong for a receiving board that has high access to 
information. In short, the receiving board’s access to information is captured by 
closeness centrality, measuring the shortest distance to all other firms in the network. I 
present my argument below:  
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Hypothesis 5 (H5): The greater the access to information of the receiving board 
of the focal firm, the lower the likelihood that the focal firm will also implement 
M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm that has already 
implemented the strategic action. 
 
I have proposed how dyad and structural level factors can influence the diffusion 
of M&As in emerging markets. I now turn to the effects of interlocking directors. 
 
Interlocking Directors 
 An interlocking director serves as an important channel for information flow as 
previously discussed. Shropshire (2010) is one of the first scholars to discuss individual 
interlocking directors and theorized their effects on diffusion. She proposed factors such 
as interlocking directors’ organizational identification, access to CEO, and breadth of 
experiences increased the likelihood of diffusion, whereas ingratiatory behaviors 
decreased it. Building on prior scholars’ work, I hypothesize that other characteristics of 
the interlocking directors facilitate diffusion. I explain as follows. 
 
Chair on either Board 
The position of an interlocking director is likely to be an important factor in 
determining whether s/he can influence a firm’s action, especially in the case of M&As 
in emerging markets, given that it is a strategic action that involves a great amount of 
risk. Finkelstein (1992) described four types of managerial power: structural, ownership, 
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expert, and prestige. A chair position results in structural power as well as a position of 
status. Research has shown that when directors hold important positions on the board, it 
can also increase a director’s reputation (Deutsch & Ross, 2003; Yermack, 2004). 
Hence, a chair is more likely to have an important influence on deciding whether the 
focal firm will follow the interlocked firm to implement M&As in emerging markets.  
I base my arguments on the following: as a chair of a sending board, s/he carries 
prestige and prominence. They both matter to the diffusion of M&As in emerging 
markets. First, information from a board interlock helps the focal firm mitigate 
uncertainty about emerging markets. Because emerging markets are fast-growing 
markets and the government policy may not be consistent or stable, a firm has to rely on 
other sources for information. In particular, an interlocking director can transfer valuable 
information from the interlocked firm that has implemented M&As in emerging markets 
to the focal firm. When the source is from the chair of the sending board, the focal firm 
is more likely to view the source as legitimate. The information from the interlocking 
director, who is also the chair of the sending board, carries authority from the 
interlocked firm. Given that M&As in emerging markets are difficult to implement and 
reverse, a legitimate source from an authority figure is more likely to help the focal firm 
make a decision on whether to implement M&As in emerging markets. Second, a chair 
is also viewed as highly responsible for the interlocked firm’s strategies. Naturally, the 
focal firm is more likely to value the information on M&As in emerging markets from a 
chair who is responsible for the strategic action in the interlocked firm. 
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The prominence of an interlocking director on the receiving board is also an 
important factor in determining diffusion. When the interlocking director is also the 
chair of the receiving board, it is also more likely to facilitate the diffusion of the M&As 
in emerging markets. As previously discussed, a chair occupies a position of status and 
power, and thus, a chair of the receiving board carries more status and power on his/her 
board as well. When s/he brings information on M&As in emerging markets back to 
his/her own board, other directors are more likely to value the information because it is 
from the chair of the receiving board. Also, a chair of a receiving board is more likely to 
be knowledgeable about the firm’s strengths and weaknesses. S/he is likely to be able to 
apply his/her knowledge of the focal firm when s/he brings back information on M&As 
in emerging markets. Thus, a chair of the receiving board is more likely to convince 
other board members and the focal firm that M&As in emerging markets can be 
beneficial to the firm.  
In summary, because M&As in emerging markets are not a strategic action that 
can be easily implemented due to the potential risks, a chair of either board will serve as 
a more legitimate carrier of information that can deliver more authority over the 
information from the interlocked firm to the focal firm.  
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): When the interlocking director is a chair on either board, the 
focal firm is more likely to implement M&As in emerging markets following its 
interlocked firm that has already implemented the strategic action. 
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Director’s Tenure on Receiving Board 
It is important to distinguish the difference between a director’s tenure on the 
receiving board from the duration of an interlock on the dyad level. Director’s tenure 
refers to the interlocking director’s length of service on the receiving board, whereas 
duration of an interlock refers to the length of the tie between two firms. For instance, a 
director can work for the focal firm for ten years but only serve as an interlocking 
director between the focal firm and the interlocked firm for two years. There are several 
reasons why an interlocking director that has served a longer period of time on the 
receiving board is more likely to help the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. First, 
when an interlocking director’s tenure is longer on the receiving board, it is more likely 
that other board members trust him/her more. S/he has had longer time to interact with 
other board members and knows the board’s social norms and group dynamics. Because 
M&As in emerging markets require a firm to commit a great amount of resources within 
a market structure that is not as open or established as a developed market, other board 
members will more likely trust the interlocking director that has been with the firm for a 
long time.  
Second, when the interlocking director has a long tenure with the focal firm, it is 
more likely that the executives will trust him/her more. Executives are the ones that will 
be held responsible for the firm’s profits and losses. When they see their interlocked firm 
implement M&As in emerging markets, they will not simply follow the strategic action. 
They are likely to investigate the information transferred from the interlocking director. 
When the director has been with the firm for a long time, the executives are more likely 
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to value the information. In fact, research has shown that a longer-tenured director is 
likely to be more influential as length of service is also one of the sources of power and 
position (Finkelstein, 1992). 
Third, when the tenure of the interlocking director is long, s/he is likely to 
accumulate more firm-specific knowledge about the focal firm; this in turn increases 
his/her ability to influence strategy. Because M&As in emerging markets are complex 
strategies, a longer tenured interlocking director on the receiving board is more likely to 
know how the information can be applied in his/her own firm and see the value of going 
into emerging markets. Thus, the likelihood of diffusion is increased. Finally, social 
network theory suggests that the length of an individual within an organization 
contributes to the legitimacy of the information transferred. Thus, a longer-tenured 
director’s opinions may carry more legitimacy and influence. A legitimate source of 
information is crucial because M&As in emerging markets are not a strategic action that 
can be easily reversed. Hence, the focal firm is more likely to value an interlocking 
director’s information when it is deemed legitimate. This can suggest that the diffusion 
of M&As in emerging markets is more likely when the interlocking director has been on 
the receiving board for a longer period of time.   
 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): The longer the tenure of the interlocking director on the 
receiving board of the focal firm, the greater the likelihood that the focal firm 
will also implement M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm 
that has already implemented the strategic action. 
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Director’s Ownership in Focal Firm 
So far, I have discussed the effects of an interlocking director’s position on either 
board and his/her tenure on the receiving board. Other than the influence of being a chair 
or being long tenured, other governance mechanisms can influence the diffusion of 
M&As in emerging markets as well. Researchers have suggested that there can be 
potential conflicts of interests between agents and owners if the agents do not have an 
ownership interest in the firm (Berle & Means, 1932). Other scholars further proposed 
that the likelihood of the executives to maximize shareholders’ wealth is dependent upon 
the amount of equity ownership they have with the firm (Eisenhardt, 1989; Walking & 
Long, 1984). This view has been confirmed by empirical research that showed when 
executives increased their ownership of the firm they were less likely to make decisions 
that would decrease the value of the firm (Dalton & Rechner, 1989). Although directors 
represent the shareholders, the same principle applies to them. Board of directors can be 
thought as the agents of the shareholders. Thus, this creates a similar agent-owner 
problem as described by agency theory. Some board reformers have called for directors 
to hold ownership of the firm and be compensated partially by firm equity (Jensen, 
1993). They argued that directors that own some equity of the firm will act more based 
upon shareholders’ interests. Empirical research has shown support for this argument. 
For instance, Hoskisson et al. (2002) showed that directors behaved more like 
shareholders (e.g., promoting long-term firm growth) when they had higher ownership. 
An emerging market has a growing economic development, and this offers a firm 
a chance to grow in the long term. An interlocking director who has a higher ownership 
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is more likely to behave like a firm’s owner who would prefer growth in the long term. 
Because the interlocking director has learned about the M&As in emerging markets from 
the interlocked firm, s/he also has more experiences in how to implement this strategic 
action. Although M&As in emerging markets are risky, experience gained by the 
interlocking director from the interlocked firm, that has implemented the strategic action, 
will aid in her/his efforts to guide the focal firm. S/he can facilitate the process by 
avoiding mistakes the interlocked firm made in the emerging markets and following 
strategies that were successfully implemented.  
In addition, when a director owns shares of the firm, s/he has more authority to 
influence strategy (Kang, 2008; Kosnik, 1990). When the interlocked firm is engaged in 
M&As in emerging markets, it is more likely that the interlocking director has 
previously reviewed the strategic action. When the director returns to his/her own board, 
he/she can transfer the knowledge and experiences gained from observing the 
interlocked firm. The higher ownership the director has in the focal firm, the more likely 
other directors and executives of the focal firm will value his/her information. For 
instance, a director that has a high percentage of ownership of the firm is likely to be 
influential in determining a firm’s strategy. Given that emerging markets present a great 
amount of uncertainties and an underdeveloped market structure, an interlocking director 
that has more ownership of the firm is likely to convince the focal firm that M&As in 
those markets can possibly bring long term growth for the firm. In short, an interlocking 
director with higher ownership will have higher influence, and this contributes to the 
diffusion process of M&As in emerging markets. 
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Hypothesis 8 (H8): The greater the ownership of the interlocking director in the 
focal firm, the greater the likelihood that the focal firm will also implement 
M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm that has already 
implemented the strategic action. 
 
I show my empirical model in Figure A-2. 
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CHAPTER IV  
METHODS  
 
Research Context  
 To test the influence of board interlocks on the diffusion of strategic actions, I 
chose a strategy that involves considerable risks and uncertainty: M&As in emerging 
markets. As previously defined, an emerging market is a lower-income country with 
fast-growing economic development and a favorable government policy towards a free-
market establishment (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Emerging markets have gained increasing 
importance in the world trade arena because they provide many business opportunities 
(Boisot & Child, 1996; Garten, 1996; Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Lamin, 2013; Wang, 
Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). In short, emerging markets offer firms tremendous 
market potential because their markets are growing at an increasing speed.  
Though emerging markets offer attractive business opportunities, doing 
businesses in emerging markets also comes with costs not typically associated with 
doing businesses in developed markets. Due to natural market imperfections in emerging 
markets, firms face challenges such as an underdeveloped market structure (Pen & 
Heath, 1996), increasing cultural distances (Ghemawat , 2001; Reus & Lamont, 2009), 
inconsistent government policies, corruptions, and many others (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008). In other words, in addition to liabilities of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), the cost of 
doing business abroad is potentially higher for firms in emerging markets compared to 
those in more developed markets (Hymer, 1976). For instance, cultural distance has been 
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discussed as a factor that influences a firm’s strategy and performance when conducting 
business aboard (Kogut & Singh, 1988). Cultural distance is the degree of dissimilarity 
in terms of cultures between the host and home countries. A high cultural distance means 
that the host country’s culture is very different from the home country’s culture. This can 
mean many things are different, for instance, language, business customs, and 
expectations in society. Researchers have shown that when the cultural distance is high, 
a multinational firm’s performance may suffer (Luo & Peng, 1999).  
On the other hand, scholars have been very interested in M&As; however, very 
few studies are focused on M&As in emerging markets (Sethi & Krishnakumar, 2013). 
Because expansion into emerging markets involves considerable risks, I expect 
information transferred through board interlocks to become more important. It is likely 
that firms would seek information from their board interlock network to help reduce 
uncertainty on M&As in emerging markets. Prior research also confirmed that firms 
were more likely to expand into China when they were interlocked with firms that had 
successfully expanded into China (Connelly et al., 2011).  
Because there are many emerging markets in the world, I limit my sample to 
emerging markets in Brazil, Russia, India, and China. They are commonly referred to as 
the BRIC countries (Yiu, Lau, Bruton, 2007). The term BRIC was first coined by Jim 
O’Neil, the global economist at Goldman Sachs (Hult, 2009). He argued that emerging 
markets of the BRIC countries will become extremely important in the coming decades. 
According to the 2013 International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, the 
BRIC countries accounts for about 40 percent of the world’s population, and they are 
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among the fastest economic growth in the world. Hult (2009) argued that BRIC 
countries are similar in terms of economic growth; they also have similar strengths and 
weaknesses. Their common strengths include a wealth of natural resources, diversified 
economy, and a growing population. Their common weaknesses include a lack of social 
structure, a higher level of corruption, and an increasing income gap between the rich 
and the poor. In addition, Mobarek and Fiorante (2014) showed that BRIC countries 
share similarly weak market efficiency compared to other developed countries. Extant 
research also confirms that BRIC countries are gaining importance in the world 
economy and the studies on BRIC countries are much needed (Muller, 2011; Sauvant, 
2005). Given that the BRIC countries are extremely important in the world economy and 
their similarity in terms of market structure and market development, they are suitable 
subjects in my study. 
  
Sample 
The sample for this dissertation was drawn from firms in the S&P 1500, Fortune 
500 and 1000 Index, and Russell 1000 and 3000 Index from 2001 to 2012. It is 
important to know that my sample period includes two recessions in 2001 and from 
2008-2009 (Bartram & Bodnar, 2009), and there has been evidence that M&As can be 
affected by a recession (Aguiar & Gopinath, 2005). Gaughan (2011) found that the 
recession of 2008 decreased most firms’ number of M&A activities. Because the 
recessions influenced most of the firms in my sample, the overall level of M&A 
activities should increase or decrease as a whole. Further, because my sample covers 
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from 2001 to 2012, this longer period should minimize the influence of the recessions on 
my analyses of how board interlocks influence the diffusion of M&As in emerging 
markets.          
I used Thomson One database to collect data on all completed M&As that were 
undertaken by the firms in my sample from 2001 to 2012. The initial search gave me a 
total of 5,456 M&As, and they included deal-level information (e.g. target country and 
M&A size). I coded whether the M&As occurred in one of the BRIC countries. Table A-
2 shows the number of M&As in or not in BRIC countries each year. I then added the 
total number of M&As for a focal firm for each year. Next, I matched the focal firm’s 
M&A activities with COMPUSTAT North America for firm-level information. 
The director data was drawn from Corporate Library. The director data includes 
variables specific to each individual directors (e.g., name, tenure, committee 
memberships, independence classification, number of other boards, shares owned, etc.). 
I transformed a two-mode (firm-by-director) matrix to a one-mode (firm-by-firm) matrix 
for each year, 2001-2012. Next, I transformed the firm-by-firm matrix to a vector of 
firm-to-firm dyad relations. I then matched the director data with the first merged data 
with M&As and firm-level information. Due to missing data, my final data include 5,976 
dyad firm-to-firm observations from 2001-2012. There are on average 314 firms for each 
year. 
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Measures 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the rate of occurrence from one firm to another. In my 
study, the occurrence of interest is M&As in one (or more) of the BRIC countries. In 
order to use event history analysis, the dependent variable consists of two variables. The 
first is an integer variable measuring the year. The second is a dummy variable showing 
whether the focal firm has implemented M&As in BRIC countries one year after the 
interlocked firm has implemented them. It is coded 1 if the focal firm has implemented 
them and 0 otherwise. I excluded M&As that were incomplete or were repurchases. 
Repurchases occurs when a firm buys back its own shares. Because my dissertation 
focuses on diffusion, repurchases are not a result of diffusion and thus should not be 
included. 
 
Independent Variables 
  I calculated board interlock measures for each firm using UCINET 6.458 
(Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). I constructed an undirected two-mode (firm-by-
director) network of board interlocks each year. I then transformed the two-mode matrix 
into a one-mode (firm-by-firm) matrix for each year. A tie exists when two firms share a 
common director. Following prior studies, all the variables are lagged by one year 
(Beckman et al., 2004; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). 
Duration of an Interlock. It is measured by the length of the tie. In the case of 
two firms sharing more than one director, I used the tie with the longest length. For 
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instance, if two firms share two common directors, the time for the director that has 
served the longest period as the interlocking director between the focal firm and the 
interlocked firm was used. The duration is in years. It is lagged by 1 year.  
Closed Triad. It is a dichotomized variable: when the focal firm and the 
interlocked firm are in a closed triad, it is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. It is lagged by 1 
year. 
Number of Cliques. It is measured by the number of cliques two firms are both 
in. I define a clique as the maximal subgroups in which the distance between the focal 
firm and the interlocked firm (i, j) is no greater than two steps. I calculated cliques using 
2-clans approach using UCINET. Thus: d(i, j) ≤ 2. It is lagged by 1 year. 
Sending Board’s Influence. It is operationalized by Eigenvector centrality. It 
was obtained from UCINET and a normalized measure. (See Appendix C for specific 
definitions). It is lagged by 1 year. 
Receiving Board’s Access to Information. It is by closeness centrality. It was 
also obtained from UCINET and a normalized measure. (See Appendix C for specific 
definitions). It is lagged by 1 year. 
Chair on Either Board. It is a dichotomized variable: an interlocking director 
who is also a chair in either focal firm or interlocked firm is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
It is lagged by 1 year. 
Director Tenure on Receiving Board. It is measured as the length of time an 
interlocking director has served on the receiving board. It is measured in year. It is 
lagged by 1 year. 
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Director Ownership in Focal Firm. It is the percentage of the ownership the 
interlocking director has over the focal firm. It is lagged by 1 year. 
 
Control Variables 
Research has shown that larger firms are more likely to increase their M&As in 
foreign countries (Tallman & Li, 1996). This can be explained by the fact that larger 
firms have more resources and are able to use them to operate in foreign markets.  Thus, 
I controlled for firm size; it is measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of 
employees (Size). Prior studies have also shown that performance may influence M&A 
activities for international firms (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Similar to larger firms, 
better performing firms may have more resources to cover the costs associated with 
M&As in emerging markets. Therefore, I controlled for firm performance using return 
on sales, ROS. Firms may also increase their M&As in emerging markets in order to 
balance their problems in domestic markets (Doukas & Travlos, 1988). Because when a 
firm has a higher leverage, the firm has to use more of its resources to cover debt. This 
may reduce a firm’s ability to implement M&As in emerging markets. Thus, I included 
Firm Leverage, measured as debt divided by sales, as a control variable.  
Past experiences in the BRIC countries are likely to influence a focal firm’s 
subsequent M&As in the BRIC countries. Thus, I controlled for Past BRIC, captured by 
whether the focal firm has implemented M&As in one (or more) of the BRIC countries 
in the past 5 years. It is a binary variable; 1 is yes, and 0 otherwise. It is also possible 
that a firm’s overall level of international diversification can influence its tendency to 
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implement M&As in BRIC countries. Thus, I controlled for Total M&As, as measured 
by the total number of M&A activities by the focal firm in the given year.  
Studies have shown that board size is positively related to firm performance 
(Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). This is most likely due to the diverse 
expertise and information it brings as a board becomes larger. Also, a larger board 
means that it is more likely to have at least one member that specializes or has 
experiences in international diversification. Thus, I controlled for Receiving Board Size, 
measured by the number of directors on the receiving board. Average industry 
experience may also influence M&As in emerging markets because each industry has a 
different propensity towards M&As in emerging markets. I controlled for mean 
occurrence of M&As in BRIC countries for firms in the same two-digit SIC (Industry 
M&As). Finally, I included M&A Size (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002) as the natural log 
of the value of the M&A in millions of US dollars. All above control variables are 
lagged by 1 year (Beckman et al., 2004; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1997). All variables are summarized in Table A-3.  
 
Analysis 
 As previously mentioned my sample is composed as firm-to-firm dyad relations, 
and this allows for examination of board interlock networks rather than focusing on an 
individual firm (Connelly et al., 2011; Valente, 2005). I first used social network 
analysis to capture network measures. My analytical methodology was event history 
analysis with the firm-to-firm dyad relations as the level of analysis. Event history 
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analysis is a suitable methodology to study occurrence/exit of an event, and it is not 
biased by right-censoring (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). When the interlocked 
firm implemented M&As in the BRIC countries during the observation period, the focal 
firm that is interlocked to it is included in the sample. When the focal firm also 
implemented M&As in one (or more) of the BRIC countries, it exited the sample. 
However, it is possible that the focal firm may not implement M&As by the end of 
observation period (2011). This is a right-censoring bias but I can avoid this problem 
using event history analysis.  
I used Cox proportional hazard model:   
 
 The Cox proportional hazard model is more robust than other models (e.g., 
exponential models) because it does not restrict the form of the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. For each year, when the focal firm also 
implemented M&As in one (or more) of the BRIC countries following the interlocked 
firm, it was coded 1. If the focal firm did not implemented M&As in one (or more) of 
the BRIC countries, it was coded 0. Coding this way, the event history analysis read 0 as 
a censored observation. When the event occurred (coded as 1), the focal firm was 
dropped from the dataset. I used STATA 12.1 to run the analysis. 
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CHAPTER V  
RESULTS  
 
 Table A-4 represents descriptive statistics and intercorrelations. I used OLS 
models to calculate variance inflation factor (VIF) scores because it is more conservative 
for this type of diagnostic test (Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck, & Shimizu, 2006). The 
results suggest that multicollinearity does not present any problem given that all the VIF 
scores were below 4.0. Receiving Board’s Access to Information has the highest VIF 
(3.87), followed by Director Tenure on Receiving Board (3.21) and Duration of an 
Interlock (2.99). The rest variables have VIFs ranged from 1.02 to 2.61. The average 
VIF is 1.81 (see Table A-5).  
 
Event History Analysis 
I used continuous-time event history analysis with covariates that vary with time 
(Yamaguchi, 1991). Given that event history analysis models the rate of occurrence of a 
particular event during the observation period, it is suitable to model diffusion (Valente, 
2005). In particular, many scholars have used Cox model event history analysis to study 
the diffusion of organizational behaviors (e.g., Connelly et al., 2011; Yu & Cannella, 
2007). Table A-6 presents the results from the Cox Model event history analysis. Model 
1 includes only the control variables (Size, ROS, Leverage, Past BRIC, Total M&As, 
Receiving Board Size, Industry M&As, and M&A Size). Model 2 includes the control 
variables and my predictors (Duration of an Interlock, Closed Triad, Number of Cliques, 
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Sending Board’s Influence, Receiving Board’s Access to Information, Chair on either 
Board, Director Tenure on Receiving Board, and Director Ownership in Focal Firm).  
Model 1 included all of the control variables (Size, ROS, Leverage, Past BRIC, 
Total M&As, Receiving Board Size, Industry M&As, and M&As Size). The log likelihood 
is -3018.8931 and the Wald chi-square is 462.58 (with degree of freedom equals to 8) 
and statistically significant at p<0.001. Model 2 include all of the control variables and 
predictors (Duration of an Interlock, Closed Triad, Number of Cliques, Sending Board’s 
Influence, Receiving Board’s Access to Information, Chair on Either Board, Director 
Tenure on Receiving Board, and Director Ownership in Focal Firm). Including of the 
predictors improved the model, resulting the log likelihood of -2893.3819 and the Wald 
chi-square of 900.84 (with degree of freedom equals to 16) and statistically significant at 
p<0.001. It is a significant improvement over Model 1 with only the control variables.  
 
Hypothesis Test Results 
Control Variables: Size, ROS, Leverage, Past BRIC, Total M&As, Receiving Board 
Size, Industry M&As, and M&A Size 
   The analyses show that the focal firm’s past M&A experiences in the BRIC 
countries, total number of M&As and mean occurrence of M&As in the BRIC countries 
in the industry are positively related with the focal firm’s implementation of M&As in 
emerging markets following the interlocked firm. The results are statistically significant 
across both models. The size of the receiving board and the size of M&A are negatively 
associated with the implementation of M&As in emerging markets for the focal firm; 
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they are statistically significant across both models. Firm size is positively related with 
the implementation of M&As in emerging markets but is statistically nonsignificant (p> 
.10) in both models. Firm performance (ROS) is negatively associated with M&As in 
emerging markets but is only statistically and marginally significant in the first model. 
Finally, firm leverage is positively related with M&As in emerging markets but it is not 
statistically significant in either model. I discuss the main results below. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Duration of an Interlock (Dyad Level) 
   In Hypothesis 1, I proposed that the longer the duration of the interlock between 
the focal firm and the interlocked firm, the greater the likelihood that the focal firm will 
also implement M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm. The duration 
of an interlock ranges from 0 (newly formed interlock) to 33 years in my sample. I 
proposed that the duration of an interlock reflects the strength of the tie. After the 
analysis, the result shows that the odds ratio is 1.09, which is statistically significant at 
p<0.001. This means that for one additional year of the duration of the interlock, the 
focal firm is 9 percent more likely to implement M&As in emerging markets following 
its interlocked firm. Thus, these results provide support for Hypothesis 1. 
    
Hypothesis 2: Closed Triad (Structural Level) 
   In Hypothesis 2, I predicted that when the focal firm and the interlocked firm are 
both embedded in a closed triad, the focal firm is more likely to implement M&As in 
emerging markets following the interlocked firm. I argued that because Simmelian ties 
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(ties that are formed in a closed triad) promote cohesion, the focal firm is more likely to 
be influenced by its interlocked firm in a closed triad. The odds ratio is 1.01 and is not 
statistically significant at p>0.10, meaning that when the focal firm and the interlocked 
firm are both in a closed triad, the focal firm is 1 percent more likely to implement 
M&As in emerging markets following its interlocked firm but the result is statistically 
nonsignificant. Thus, Hypothesis 2 does not receive support from these results. 
    
Hypothesis 3: Number of Cliques (Structural Level) 
   Hypothesis 3 predicted that the number of cliques in which the focal firm and the 
interlocked firm are embedded will facilitate the diffusion of the M&As in emerging 
markets. I proposed that cliques (as tightly connected subgroups) also promote cohesion 
and encourage frequent communications. In my sample, the number of cliques 
embedded by the focal firm and the interlocked firm ranges from 0 to 30, with an 
average of 4.52 cliques.  The odds ratio is 1.30, which is statistically significant at 
p<0.01. This means that for one additional clique in which both firms are embedded, the 
focal firm is 30 percent more likely to implement M&As in emerging markets following 
its interlocked firm. Thus, Hypothesis 3 receives support from these results. 
     
Hypothesis 4: Sending Board’s Influence (Structural Level) 
    Hypothesis 4 predicted that a sending board’s influence (as captured by 
Eigenvector centrality) increases the focal firm’s likelihood of implementation of M&As 
in emerging markets following its interlocked firm. I proposed that when a sending 
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board has a higher influence, it is more likely to be seen as a leader. When the 
interlocked firm implements M&As in emerging markets, it will be more likely to be 
viewed as a leader’s strategic action. And thus, the focal firm is more likely to see 
M&As in emerging markets as a legitimate and beneficial strategic action. The odds 
ratio is 1.02 and is statistically significant at p<0.05. This indicates that for one 
additional unit of a sending board’s influence, the focal firm is 2 percent more likely to 
implement M&As in emerging markets following its interlocked firm. Thus, these 
results support Hypothesis 4. 
    
Hypothesis 5: Receiving Board’s Access to Information (Structural Level) 
    In Hypothesis 5, I predicted that a receiving board’s access to information is 
negatively associated with a focal firm’s M&As in emerging markets. I proposed that 
when a receiving board has greater access to information, it is more likely to have 
received information on M&As in emerging markets from its other interlocked firms. It 
is also more likely it has enhanced access to resources. When the interlocked firm 
implements M&As in emerging markets, the focal firm is less likely to implement the 
strategic action if its receiving board has high access to information. The odds ratio is 
0.91 and statistically significant at p<0.001. This means for one additional unit increase 
of a receiving board’s access to information, the focal firm is 9 percent less likely to 
implement M&As in emerging markets following its interlocked firm. Thus, Hypothesis 
5 receives support. 
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Hypothesis 6: Chair on either Board (Interlocking Director) 
    Hypothesis 6 predicted that when the interlocking director is a chair on either 
board, s/he is more likely to have higher status. Thus, when the interlocking director 
transfer the information of M&As in emerging markets from the interlocked firm, the 
focal firm is more likely to value the information and as a result, implement this strategic 
action as well. The odds ratio is 1.23, which is statistically significant at p<0.05. This 
means when the interlocking director is also the chair on either the receiving board or the 
sending board, the focal firm is 23 percent more likely to implement M&As in emerging 
markets following its interlocked firm. Thus, the results support Hypothesis 6. 
     
Hypothesis 7: Director Tenure on Receiving Board (Interlocking Director) 
    Hypothesis 7 predicted that the interlocking director’s tenure is positively 
associated with a focal firm’s M&As in emerging markets following its interlocked firm. 
I distinguished an interlocking director’s tenure from the duration of the interlock. An 
interlocking director’s tenure is the years of service s/he had as a member of the board of 
directors for the focal firm. In my sample, it ranges from 0 (newly hired for the year of 
observation) to 40 years. I proposed that the longer a director has served for his/her firm, 
the more likely the focal firm will trust the director. A director with a long tenure also 
means that s/he is likely to know the focal firm well. Thus, the information on M&As in 
emerging markets s/he brings to the focal firm is more likely to be applied. The odds 
ratio is 0.97 and is statistically significant at p<0.05. The results mean that for one 
additional year of service by the interlocking director on the receiving board, the focal 
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firm is 3 percent less likely to implement M&As in emerging markets following its 
interlocked firm.  This is opposite of my prediction (I will discuss the results in the next 
chapter). Thus, these results do not support Hypothesis 7. 
    
Hypothesis 8: Director Ownership in Focal Firm (Interlocking Director) 
    Finally, Hypothesis 8 predicted that when the interlocking director has higher 
ownership of the firm, it is more likely that s/he will act in manners that are in 
shareholders’ best interests. As a result, a director with a higher ownership of the focal 
firm will more likely desire long-term growth for the firm. Investing in emerging 
markets is more likely to provide such opportunities because these markets have a high 
potential for growth. In my sample, the interlocking director’s ownership percentage 
ranges from 0 (no ownership) to 32.95 percent. However, the odds ratio is 0.98 and is 
statistically nonsignificant at p>0.10. As a result, Hypothesis 8 receives no support. 
 
Post Hoc Analyses 
 The design of my study focuses heavily on theoretical assumptions. For instance, 
Simmelian ties formed in closed triad is assumed to enhance cohesion and promote 
diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. Thus, a dichotomized measure (whether the 
focal firm and the interlocked firm are in a closed triad or not) was used in my analysis. 
Two of my hypotheses were nonsignificant. Hypothesis 2 predicts that when both the 
focal firm and the interlocked firm are in a closed triad together, it is more likely that the 
focal firm will implement M&As in emerging markets following its interlocked firm. 
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The result was statistically nonsignificant and the odds ratio is 1.01. Hypothesis 8 
predicts that when the interlocking director has a higher ownership in the focal firm, s/he 
is more likely to have more influence and thus, the focal firm is more likely to 
implement M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm. The result was 
also statistically nonsignificant and the odds ratio is 0.98.  
 In order to test the relationships, I conducted more post hoc analyses. First, I used 
the number of Simmelian ties between two firms instead of whether they are in a closed 
triad together. Simmel (1950) argued that a closed triad can promote cohesion and 
enhance social norms. For firms, it is very possible that it is the number of closed triads 
(thus equal to number of Simmelian ties) in which both firms are embedded that has 
more influence than simply being in a closed triad. Because of this possible alternative 
explanation, I used the number of Simmelian ties to capture the influence of closed triads 
instead of a binary variable that captures the influence of a closed triad.  
 Second, it is possible that the relationship between director ownership and 
M&As in emerging markets is a curvilinear one. In my research, I proposed that the 
higher the ownership that an interlocking director has in the focal firm, the more 
influence s/he may have on the focal firm. It is possible that the relationship can be 
nonlinear. Although I argue that the higher the ownership, the greater the influence, the 
influence can reach a peak point where the influence is no longer linear. Curvilinear 
relationships have been studied in the international business field. For instance, studies 
have shown that international diversification is curvilinearly related to firms that have 
moderated product diversifications (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). Given that it is 
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possible that the percentage of the ownership and the diffusion of M&As in emerging 
markets can be a curvilinear relationship, I squared the percentage of ownership to 
represent a director’s ownership in the focal firm. The rest variables stayed the same, 
and they are then used in Model 3. 
 Furthermore, the curvilinear relationship may also exist for the number of 
Simmelian ties used to capture Closed Triad. It is possible that the number of Simmelian 
ties can facilitate diffusion of M&As in emerging markets but its influence will reaches a 
peak at some point. Because this is also a possible alternate explanation, I squared the 
number of Simmelian ties to capture Closed Triad in Model 4.  
 Again, I used OLS models to calculate VIF scores. The results suggest that 
multicollinearity does not present any problem as all the VIF scores were below 4.0 in 
Model 3. In Model 4, Closed Triad (Number of Simmelian Ties) and the squared term of 
Closed Triad have high VIFs, which are 8.82 and 7.65 respectively. On the other hand, 
Receiving Board’s Access to Information has the highest VIF (3.85), followed by 
Director Tenure on Receiving Board (3.21) in Model 3. The average VIF is 1.95 in 
Model 3 and 2.81 in Model 4 (see Table A-7 and A-8).  
 I used Cox model event history analysis as my prior analyses. The results are 
presented in Model 3 and Model 4 (See Table A-9). Model 3 and Model 4 did not show 
a significant improvement of model fit. In Model 3, the log likelihood is -2892.6206 and 
the Wald chi-square is 906.56 (with degree of freedom equals to 17) and statistically 
significant at p<0.001. In Model 4, the log likelihood is -2892.1131 and the Wald chi-
square is 922.37 (with degree of freedom equals to 18) and statistically significant at 
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p<0.001.  Compared with Model 2, the log likelihood and Wald chi-square in Model 3 
and 4 did not show a significant model improvement. 
For the control variables, they remain largely unchanged in Model 3 and Model 
4. For the predictors that are unchanged, Duration of an Interlock, Sending Board’s 
Influence, Receiving Board’s Access to Information, Chair on either Board, and 
Director’s Tenure on Receiving Board remain largely unchanged. Their odds ratios in 
Model 3 and Model 4 are very similar to those in Model 2 and are statistically significant 
at similar probability. The number of cliques in which both firms are embedded in, 
however, was statistically significant in Model 2, but became only marginally significant 
in Model 3 and nonsignificant in Model 4. Its odds ratios are 1.30 in Model 2 and 3. In 
Model 4, it became 1.04 and statistically nonsignificant. 
 In Model 3, I used the number of Simmelian ties to capture Closed Triad, and the 
odds ratio is 1.01 and statistically nonsignificant at p>0.10. I squared the percentage of 
ownership to capture Director Ownership in Focal Firm and the odds ratio is 0.97 in the 
first level and 1.00 for the squared term. The first level is statistically and marginally 
significant at p<0.10. The squared term is statistically nonsignificant at p>0.10. Thus, 
Model 3 shows that the results remain consistent with Model 1 and Model 2 as originally 
hypothesized.  
 In Model 4, I squared the number of Simmelian ties to capture Closed Triad, and 
the odds ratio is also 1.31 in the first level and 0.94 for the squared term. They are both 
statistically nonsignificant at p>0.10. Thus, the results in Model 4 does not show support 
for a curvilinear effect between Closed Triad and diffusion of M&As in emerging 
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markets. Taking together, after modifying the variables, Closed Triad and Director 
Ownership in Focal Firm in Model 3 and 4, the results remained largely unchanged and 
do not support  for a curvilinear effect. 
 
Sensitivity Tests 
 My analysis has followed prior studies to lag variables by one year (Beckman et 
al., 2004; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Westphal & Zajac, 1997) because one year is a 
suitable time frame for the information to transfer from the interlocked firm to the focal 
firm and for the focal firm to also implement M&As in emerging markets following the 
interlocked firm. Given that it is possible that it can take 2 or 3 years for the focal firm to 
implement M&As in emerging markets, I also conducted sensitivity tests on how many 
years the predictors are lagged. In Model 5, I lagged all predictors by 2 years; in Model 
6, I lagged all predictors by 3 years. The results are in Table A-10. 
In Model 5, in which all variables are lagged by two years, the focal firm’s 
Leverage became statistically significant (at p<0.05), and the odds ratio is 1.15. 
However, Past BRIC and Total M&As became statistically nonsignificant in Model 5 
(but they were statistically significant in Model 1 and 2). The focal firm’s Size and ROS 
remain unchanged in Model 5 compared with Model 1. For the predictors, Duration of 
an Interlock, Sending Board’s Influence, and Receiving Board’s Access to Information 
remain consistent with Model 2. They are all statistically significant and predict the 
same direction as in Model 2. However, numbers of cliques in which both firms are 
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embedded, whether the interlocking director is a chair, and a director’s tenure on the 
receiving board are no longer statistically significant in Model 5.  
 In Model 6, all variables are lagged by 3 years. A focal firm’s Past BRIC 
Experiences, Receiving Board Size, Industry M&As, and M&A Size remain consistent 
with Model 1 and 2. However, size of the firm became statistically significant and a 
firm’s leverage became statistically and marginally significant in Model 6. Total M&As 
was statistically significant in Model 1 and 2 but became statistically nonsignificant in 
Model 6. In terms of predictors, only Duration of an Interlock and the Sending Board’s 
Influence remain statistically significant and predict a positive relation. Closed Triad, 
Number of Cliques, Receiving Board’s Access to Information, Chair on Either Board, 
Director’s Tenure on Receiving Board, and Director’s Ownership in Focal Firm are all 
statistically nonsignificant. Further, both Model 5 and 6 did not show model 
improvement. The Wald chi-squares are 175.42 in Model 5 and 347.91 in Model 6 
compared to 900.84 in Model 2. 
Taken together, the sensitivity tests showed that one-year lag gives the most 
robust results. We can see that even with a two-year or three-year lag, some hypotheses 
are still supported. This shows that the information transferred may be utilized later for 
the focal firm. In short, the sensitivity tests confirmed that a one-year lag on the 
variables give the most robust results and reconfirmed what prior scholars have done 
(Beckman et al., 2004; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Westphal & Zajac, 1997).  
In summary, the results provided support for five of my hypotheses. They show 
that at the dyad level, the longer the duration of an interlock, the more likely that the 
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focal firm will implement M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm. At 
the structural level, the greater number of cliques in which both firms are embedded and 
the greater the sending board’s influence, the more likely that the focal firm will 
implement M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm. On the other 
hand, the greater the receiving board’s access to information, the less likely that the 
diffusion will occur. Finally, when the interlocking director is also a chair on either the 
sending board or the receiving board, it is more likely that the focal firm will implement 
M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm. I discuss the results, 
implications, future research, and address the limitations in the next chapter. 
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 CHAPTER VI  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Discussion 
 Though most studies have shown that board interlocks are meaningful 
mechanisms, rather than random activities, the amount and type of the effects of board 
interlocks remains in question (Hallock, 1997; Mizruchi, 1996). Most scholars agree that 
board interlocks can diffuse strategic actions, but they are not consistent predictors. The 
inconsistent findings may be because the extant research has generally ignored the 
heterogeneity of the board interlocks (Shropshire, 2010) and the structure of the 
networks (Connelly et al., 2011).  
In this dissertation research, I seek to show the following. First, I intended to 
show that a tie is not just a tie, but that its strength matters. Second, I aimed to show that 
board interlocks should be addressed at the structural level as well. Finally, I wanted to 
show that an interlocking director’s characteristics influence diffusion. I chose M&As in 
emerging markets as the strategic action of interest because a firm has to take 
considerable risks when it implements M&As in emerging markets compared to those in 
more developed markets (Chari et al., 2010; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Hoskisson et al., 
2000). Thus, the information transferred from a board interlock from the interlocked 
firm to the focal firm is more likely to have an influence on diffusion. In addition, 
M&As in emerging markets is an important topic that has been understudied (Grigorieva 
& Petrunina, 2013; Sethi & Krishnakumar, 2013). As discussed throughout the 
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dissertation, emerging markets hold market potential for firms. Research has shown that 
firms investing in emerging markets have an opportunity to improve their financial 
performance (Collin, 1990; Pawaskar, 2001; Ramakrishnan, 2008).  
Prior studies on emerging markets focused on the factors that prevented firms 
from entering, such as a weak market structure (Peng & Heath, 1996), a high cultural 
distance (Ghemawat, 2001), weak corporate governance (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), and 
inconsistent government policies (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). These factors are obstacles 
for firms to enter an emerging market. Because there are costs and benefits to implement 
M&As in emerging markets, one may ask why some firms do and some don’t take these 
actions. Naturally, the question is what influences firms to enter emerging markets. As 
reviewed previously, very little research has focused on the role of board interlocks in 
the decision to implement M&As in emerging markets. Connelly et al.’s (2011) study 
was one of the first studies to examine how ties to different interlocked firms influence 
the adoption of expansion into China. They found that ties to firms that have successful 
expanded into China facilitate diffusion whereas ties to firms that have unsuccessfully 
expanded into China suppress diffusion. Their study, however, focused on only the 
direct relations at the dyad level. Given that the importance of the different level factors 
in the board interlock network, a study on how board interlocks facilitate diffusion of  
M&As in emerging markets is very much needed.  
 The primary objective of this dissertation is to explore when board interlocks 
influence diffusion of strategic actions. In the context of my dissertation research, I 
investigate when a focal firm is more likely to implement M&As in emerging markets 
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following the interlocked firm. In summary, I theorized from a multi-level perspective at 
the dyad and structural level of the network. I also predicted that the characteristics of 
the interlocking director influence the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. I applied 
social network theory and theories from structural sociology to argue for the diffusion. 
Although not all hypotheses were supported by the results of analyses, I was able to 
show that the diffusion of a strategic action can be influenced by the strength of the tie, 
the number of cliques in which both firms are embedded, the structural position of the 
sending board, the structural position of the receiving board, and whether the 
interlocking director is a chair on either the sending board or the receiving board. 
First, I showed that the duration of an interlock increases the likelihood of the 
implementation of M&As in emerging markets. This shows that a tie is not just a tie, but 
the strength of the tie matters. Most prior literature has treated all ties to be equal, and 
my analyses showed that when two firms are interlocked for a longer period of time, 
M&As in emerging markets are more likely to diffuse from the interlocked firm to the 
focal firm. I found that for every additional year increase in the duration of the interlock, 
the focal firm is 9 percent more likely to implement M&As in emerging markets 
following its interlocked firm.  
Second, I showed that the number of cliques in which both the focal firm and its 
interlock firm are embedded increases the likelihood of the implementation of M&As in 
emerging markets. I found that for each additional clique that both the focal firm and the 
interlocked firm are embedded in, the focal firm is 30 percent more likely to implement 
M&As in emerging markets following its interlocked firm. This demonstrates that when 
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two firms are overlapped in different subgroups, it is more likely for information to flow 
from the interlocked firm to the focal firm. This finding is consistent with prior studies 
that showed cliques can promote cohesion and communication.  
Third, I found that the sending board’s influence has a positive relation with the 
diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. I found that with an increase in 1 unit of a 
sending board’s influence, the focal firm is 2 percent more likely to also implement 
M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm. The effect size of 2 percent 
is relatively small compared to other findings but it still shows that when a sending 
board carries more influence, it is more likely to be viewed as a leader. Thus, when the 
interlocked firm implements M&As in emerging markets, the focal firm is more likely to 
follow this strategic action. 
Fourth, I found that a receiving board’s access to information is negatively 
related to the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. I found that a unit increase in a 
sending board’s access to information reduces the likelihood of diffusion by 9 percent. 
The results demonstrate that when a receiving board has a greater access to information, 
it is more likely to have received information on M&As in emerging markets before the 
information is transferred from the interlocked firm. Thus, the influence on the focal 
firm from the interlocked firm is diminished. In other words, the information transferred 
by the interlocking director from the interlocked firm is most likely to be valued when 
there is no other information available.   
Finally, I also found that when an interlocking director is a chair on either the 
sending or the receiving board, the likelihood of diffusion of M&As in emerging 
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markets increases. When the interlocking director is a chair on either board, the focal 
firm is 23 percent more likely to implement M&As in emerging markets following the 
interlocked firm. This confirms my hypothesis that when an interlocking director is a 
chair of a board, s/he carries more prestige and authority. Thus, the focal firm is more 
likely to value the information s/he brings back from the interlocked firm. 
On the other hand, my results showed that being in a closed triad does not 
increase the likelihood of the implementation of M&As in emerging markets following 
the interlocked firm. The odds ratio is 1.01 and statistically nonsignificant. In my post 
hoc analyses, I replaced the binary variable (indicating whether both firms are in a 
closed triad) with a count variable (capturing how many closed triads in which both 
firms are embedded) and a squared term of the count variable of the number of closed 
triads (capturing whether there is a curvilinear effect of the number of closed triads). The 
odds ratios were 1.31 and 0.94 respectively, in which both were statistically 
nonsignificant at p>0.10.  
One possible explanation for the non-finding of the closed triad hypothesis could 
be because being in a closed triad with the interlocked firm is not enough for the 
information to be transferred frequently to the focal firm. Because the number of cliques 
is shown to positively increase the likelihood of implementation following the 
interlocked firm, this may indicate that cliques are more important in the case of the 
diffusion of strategic actions. Simply put, my results may suggest the influence of 
cliques is greater than the influence of a closed triad. Also, it is possible that the outcome 
of my choice (M&As in BRIC countries) may not be a suitable outcome to test the 
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closed triad hypothesis. I will further discuss this non-finding in Implications for Theory 
and Practice.  
Furthermore, prior scholars suggested that researchers should examine the 
importance of interlocking directors (Shropshire, 2010) and I investigated the 
characteristics of the interlocking directors. I found that an interlocking director’s tenure 
is actually negatively related with the likelihood of the focal firm implementing M&As 
in emerging markets following the interlocked firm. The odds ratio is 0.97 and it is 
statistically significant. This means that for one additional year that the interlocking 
director serves on the receiving board, the focal firm is 3 percent less likely to 
implement M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm. This result is 
opposite of my prediction.  
One possible explanation may be because of the knowledge of the interlocking 
director on the focal firm. When an interlocking director has a longer tenure on the 
receiving board, s/he is more likely to generate knowledge specifically about the focal 
firm. When the interlocking director learns about the M&As in emerging markets in the 
interlocked firm, s/he may be less likely to be convinced that it is a strategic action worth 
following simply because the interlocked firm is doing it. Thus, when the interlocking 
director transfers the information back to the focal firm, s/he may be able to identify the 
real costs and benefits with other board members and the TMT of the focal firm 
regarding implementing M&As in emerging markets. In other words, an interlocking 
director that has been on the receiving board for a longer period of time may be less 
likely to want to blindly follow the interlocked firm’s strategic action. In this vein, the 
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information s/he brings back from the interlocked firm to the focal firm is more likely to 
be assessed carefully specifically for the focal firm.  
Another alternative explanation of the negative relations between an interlocking 
director’s tenure and the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets could be that the 
longer that the director has served on the receiving board, the less likely other board 
members and executives trust him/her. It could be that because other board members and 
executives have known the director for a long period of time so they are less likely to 
believe in any information the director brings in. On the other hand, it is also possible 
that the longer the director has served on the receiving board, the less active the director 
becomes. It could be because the interlocking director has served on the board for a long 
period of time, s/he becomes less involved with the process of making decisions for 
strategic actions. This could be explained by agency theory that the managers hold 
information and will make decisions regardless of whether they benefit the owners or 
not. In this case, a long tenured director may not be as active and involved as a shorter 
tenured director in monitoring and advising executives.   
Finally, my results did not support that an interlocking director’s ownership is 
positively related with the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. The odds ratio is 
0.98 and statistically nonsignificant. Because my original model cannot capture 
curvilinear effect, I conducted more post hoc analyses by squaring the percentage of the 
ownership of the interlocking director. The odds ratios are 0.97 in the first level and 1.02 
for the squared term, in which are still statistically nonsignificant. Thus, the results of 
 89 
 
 
interlocking director’s ownership in the focal firm do not support that it is positively 
related with the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets.  
One possible explanation for the nonsignificant findings of the influence of the 
interlocking director’s ownership in the focal firm on the diffusion of M&As in 
emerging markets could be due to my assumptions of the benefits of M&As in emerging 
markets. Although emerging markets are growing markets that can provide great market 
potentials for firms (Chari et al., 2010; Hoskisson et al., 2000), not every firm will 
benefit from the market potential. As discussed throughout this dissertation, investing in 
emerging markets can be more risky for firms than investing in more developed markets 
due to factors such as underdeveloped market structure (Pen & Heath, 1996), higher 
culture distance (Reus & Lamont, 2009), and weak corporate governance (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000). Thus, an interlocking director that has a high ownership in the focal firm 
may or may not view M&As in emerging markets as an attractive or unattractive 
strategic action. In this vein, an interlocking director’s ownership in the focal firm may 
not have an influence on the diffusion of the M&As in emerging markets due to their 
assessment of the strategic actions that the interlocking director may have towards 
M&As in emerging markets.  
In summary, although three of my eight hypotheses were not supported, I was 
able to show that the strength of a tie, the number of cliques in which both firms are 
embedded, the structural positions of the sending board and the receiving board, and 
whether a director is a chair on either board influence the diffusion of M&As in 
emerging markets. I was not able to show that being in a closed triad by the focal firm 
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and the interlocked firm, the interlocking director’s tenure on the receiving board, and 
the interlocking director’s ownership in the focal firm increase the likelihood of a focal 
firm’s implementation of M&As in emerging markets following its interlocked firm. 
However, I also provided alternative explanations above. I address the implications, 
opportunities for future research, and limitations of my dissertation below. I believe 
future studies can benefit from my dissertation research.  
 
Implications for Theory and Practice 
 My dissertation has several implications for theory. First, I was able to show that 
tie strength is important to explain complex social phenomenon that are previously 
unexplained. Previous scholars on board interlock studies have in general overlooked the 
heterogeneity of a tie and thus this may account for the inconclusive influence of board 
interlocks (Shropshire, 2010). In my dissertation, I was able to show that the strength of 
a tie, as represented by the duration of an interlock at the dyad level, can enrich our 
understanding of how diffusion of strategic actions can occur in the board interlock 
network. Social network scholars have long called for the importance of the strength of a 
tie (Borgatti, 2003; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Thus, the results from my study has an 
important theoretical implication for future board interlock studies to include the 
strength of a tie that can better explain the influence of board interlocks.   
 Second, my research shows the important influence of subgroups, namely 
cliques. It further shows the importance of examining the structural embeddedness of a 
firm in the board interlock network. The theoretical implication is that diffusion does not 
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occur in any situation; it suggests that researchers should examine the network structure 
and identify structural level factors that can influence a specific organizational outcome 
of interest. In my dissertation, I was interested in M&As in emerging markets. Because it 
is a strategic action that requires managers taking relatively more risks than M&As in 
developed markets, cliques became an important factor to facilitate diffusion given that 
they can promote cohesion and frequency of communications within the subgroups. 
Thus, it is also possible that some organizational outcomes do not require both firms to 
be embedded in different cliques together in order for diffusion to occur. The implication 
from my results is that more complex strategic actions are harder to diffuse, and 
subgroups can facilitate the process. In other words, embedding in different cliques 
together can facilitate information transfer and allow the focal firm the opportunity to 
utilize the information, thus resulting in diffusion. 
Third, my dissertation shows that it is important for researchers to distinguish 
different centrality constructs. My review of literature confirms that scholars have 
generally not considered the influence of other centrality constructs. In general, existing 
literature has examined the influence of degree centrality, taking account only direct ties 
and overlooking indirect ties (Bohman, 2012). I was able to show that Eigenvector 
centrality can represent a sending board’s influence and closeness centrality can 
represent a receiving board’s access to information because they consider all firms in the 
network, thus including the indirect ties. This shows that not all centralities are created 
equal. I believe that it is an important theoretical implication for future researchers when 
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they try to study the diffusion of strategic actions. Researchers can examine their 
research context and apply a centrality construct that best represents the context. 
Fourth, the lack of support for the influence of a closed triad has several 
important theoretical implications for future research. The original theory of a closed 
triad (Simmel, 1950) focuses on the interactions between three individuals. The ties 
formed in a closed triad, Simmelian ties, have been shown to increase interactions and 
social cohesions among people (Krackhardt, 1999). In the context of my dissertation, it 
is firms that are the subjects of study. The effect on the individual level may not have 
been realized on the organizational level. Thus, when the focal firm and the interlocked 
firm are both embedded in a closed triad, this may not be sufficient enough for 
information to flow frequently and repeatedly. On the other hand, the number of cliques 
is positively related to the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. Cliques are tightly 
connected subgroups that are more likely to promote group norms and thus enhance 
cohesion; they have been well documented in the organizational setting (Moody 
&White, 2003). In this vein, the results from my dissertation research show that cliques 
are more likely to facilitate diffusion than being in a closed triad at the organizational 
level.  
It is also possible that the theory of triad does not apply in the context of the 
diffusion of M&As in emerging markets, specifically, BRIC countries. Given that I 
limited my sample firms to firms implementing M&As in one or more of the BRIC 
countries, the closed triad hypothesis may not be valid in this case. Further, the 
nonsignificant relation between a closed triad and the diffusion of M&As in emerging 
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markets may be further explored by the idea of network transitivity (Uzzi & Gillespie, 
2002). Network transitivity indicates that a firm can gain resources from its tie to another 
firm that is connected with an independent third party but the three do not need to be in a 
closed triad. Thus, the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets may occur when three 
firms are not in a closed triad. Rather, when the focal firm and the interlocked firm are 
connected to a common third party, the information on M&As in emerging markets may 
be transferred from the interlocked firm to the focal firm.    
Finally, although researchers have examined the influence of board interlocks on 
diffusion, few studies have examined it through a multi-level perspective. Limiting the 
study of diffusion through board interlocks to one single level may be the reason why 
many prior studies cannot find the influence of board interlocks on diffusion. Given that 
prior studies have had mixed results on the influence of board interlocks on diffusion, it 
is understandable that critics questioned whether board interlocks matter (Mizruchi, 
1996). In this dissertation, I offered cross-level integrations of theory to explain how 
M&As in emerging markets can be diffused through variance of board interlocks. This 
shows that researchers should not depend on using a single level of theory; an 
organizational phenomenon should be examined through different levels, including 
individual, dyad, and structural levels. In the management field, many studies still rely 
on a single level of analysis (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). Although three 
of my hypotheses were not supported, the rest of the hypotheses did support the notion 
of a multi-level perspective.  
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 Next, the results of my dissertation have several implications for practice. 
According to research, most directors are hired based on their skills and experiences 
(Kim & Cannella, 2008). My dissertation shows that an interlocking director’s ties can 
transfer information from the interlocked firm to the focal firm. Social network 
perspectives suggest that firms that are embedded in the board interlock network can 
leverage social relations and reap the benefits of social capital that are not available to 
firms outside of the network. Thus, when a firm hires a director that has ties to other 
firms that are engaging in important strategic actions (such as M&As in emerging 
markets), the focal firm can possibly learn from the experiences of the interlocked firm 
through the interlocking director. Hence, a firm should not only value a director’s skills 
and experiences, but also his/her ties to other firms.  
It is true that some firms might have already considered the importance of the 
interlocking director’s ties but my results show that most firms should revisit their 
criteria of evaluating their directors. The nominating committee of a firm should 
carefully review the composition of their boards. When electing a new director, 
candidates should be reviewed based on their ability and association with other firms. 
Further, there has been a trend to limit the number of a director’s outside directorships. 
A firm may show shareholders a more holistic view of the benefits of an interlocking 
director by documenting the interlocking director’s ties with other firms in the annual 
letter to shareholders. A firm can show the shareholders how the firm uses information 
gained from board interlocks with other firms to benefits shareholders. 
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 Similarly, given that interlocking director can serve as a channel for information 
to flow from the interlocked firm to the focal firm, this means that a focal firm can 
proactively seek information from its interlocked firms. Of course, some information is 
not to be shared though interlocking directors due to trade secrets, but other information 
may be shared. For instance, the interlocked firm that has implemented M&As in one of 
the BRIC countries may share with the focal firm what the market is like there. The 
interlocked firm can explain the general environment in the specific country and help the 
focal firm understand the challenges the interlocked firm face and the opportunities in 
the market. The focal firm can also proactively seek for more information on how an 
M&A can be best implemented in the country. This type of information is not firm 
specific, but requires the focal firm to learn from the interlocked firm’s first-hand 
experience. Further, this also implies that if a firm wants to move into a new market, it 
can hire a director that has the experience or has access to information regarding the new 
market. The implication for practice is that firms can actively seek directors that can 
offer information the firms need. 
 My dissertation shows that certain board interlocks facilitate the diffusion of 
M&As in emerging markets. I highlight that the longer duration of the tie and when the 
interlocking director is a chair on either board will increase the likelihood of the focal 
firm’s implementation of M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm. 
This shows how the focal firm can be influenced by these factors. Thus, when executives 
are considering implementing a complex strategic action following its interlocked firms, 
it may be beneficial for the executives to consider the duration of the tie and the position 
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of the interlocking directors. The executives should try to make the best decision based 
on a realistic assessment of costs and benefits of implementing a specific strategic 
action. Knowing that certain ties can influence the decision can make the executives 
more aware of the situation and have a better understanding of the strategic action.       
 Finally, my dissertation also has an important implication for the government in 
emerging markets. I was able to show that board interlocks can facilitate the diffusion of 
M&As in emerging markets. Given that the diffusion can occur through board 
interlocks, a positive experience of a foreign firm that has implemented M&As in the 
emerging market can possibly bring many other firms to implement M&As in that 
particular emerging market as well. In other words, if board interlocks can diffuse 
M&As in emerging markets, a firm that is being merged or acquired should serve as a 
good example; this can attract more future investments from abroad. Given that the 
governments in emerging markets want to encourage FDIs in their respective countries 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Zhou et al., 2013), they can facilitate more positive 
experiences to promote M&As in their countries. I believe this is an important 
implication for the governments in emerging markets because the governments can 
attract more investments from abroad. In summary, M&As in emerging markets can be 
extremely important strategic actions for firms and for the host governments to attract 
FDIs. My dissertation offers several implications for implementing M&AS in emerging 
markets.  
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Future Research 
 I believe my dissertation provides a foundation for several areas for future 
research. While I mainly focused on the social network perspective, other theories may 
be applicable, especially in understanding the lack of support for some of my 
hypotheses. Resource dependence theory indicates that the complexity of the 
environment will influence the value of interlocking directors (Boyd, 1990). For 
instance, Carpenter and Westphal (2001) found that a director’s outside board 
experience can influence the director’s contribution to a firm’s strategic action. In other 
words, interlocking directors that are on other boards and can provide relevant strategic 
knowledge are more likely to be more involved in the focal firm’s strategic decision 
making processes. In this vein, it is likely that if the interlocked firm can provide 
relevant knowledge for the focal firm, the interlocking director can utilize the 
information and increase the likelihood of diffusion.  
Further, it is also possible that when an interlocking director can provide relevant 
information regarding the strategic action, the focal firm is more likely to commit a more 
substantial amount of resources in M&As. For instance, when relevant strategic 
knowledge is provided by the interlocking director from the interlocked firm, the focal 
firm is more likely to engage in higher percentage of the M&As. Thus, future research 
can consider the characteristics of the interlocked firm and the relevance of the 
interlocked firm’s strategy compared with the focal firm’s strategy. 
Similarly, organizational learning theory suggests that organizations make 
decisions based on past experiences (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Past experiences of the focal 
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firm with the interlocked firm may have an influence on the likelihood of diffusion of 
strategic actions from the interlocked from to the focal firm. For instance, if the focal 
firm has followed a strategic action from the interlocked firm and it improved the focal 
firm’s performance, the focal firm may be more likely to follow the interlocked firm 
again when the interlocked firm implements M&As in the emerging markets. On the 
other hand, if the focal firm has followed the interlocked firm’s strategic action and it 
did not improve the focal firm’s performance, the focal firm may be less inclined to 
implement M&As in emerging markets following the interlocked firm. In this vein, past 
experiences with the interlocked firm may influence the likelihood of diffusion of 
M&As in emerging markets. Applying organizational learning theory may provide 
future research more contextual understanding of what influences the diffusion of 
strategic actions.  
 To address the lack of support for the hypotheses related to the individual 
interlocking directors’ tenure on the receiving board and ownership in the focal firm, 
future studies may examine the question from a social identity perspective (Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989). Social identity theory suggests that social identity is a perception that an 
individual has about him/herself within a group, and this perception leads to activities 
that match with the identity. Applying social identity theory, scholars may examine the 
social identity of the interlocking directors. It may be that when the interlocking director 
is more identified with the interlocked firm that has implemented M&As in emerging 
markets, the strategic action is more likely to be diffused to the focal firm.  
 99 
 
 
Future research can also examine different type of organizational ties and their 
influence on diffusion of strategic actions. While my dissertation captures the board 
interlock ties, there are other different type of organizational ties, for instance, common 
industry membership, parent-subsidiary, strategic alliances, and friendship ties between 
executives of two firms. Though research has shown that interlocks reflect meaningful 
social ties, the board interlock network does not reflect all ties that a firm has (Borgatti 
& Foster, 2003).  
In my dissertation, I was able to theorize and empirically test when board 
interlocks facilitate diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. My results support that a 
longer duration of a tie, a greater number of overlapping cliques, a greater sending 
board’s influence, and when the interlocking director is also a chair on either board 
increase the likelihood of diffusion of M&As in emerging markets, whereas when a 
receiving board has more access to information decreases the likelihood. Future studies 
can examine other types of organizational ties to study the diffusion of strategic actions. 
For instance, scholars can study how informal ties of executives in a TMT between two 
firms influence the diffusion of strategic actions. Westphal and his colleagues have 
extensively studied how a CEO’s friendship ties influence a firm’s strategy (McDonald 
& Westphal, 2003; Westphal, 1999; Westphal et al., 2006). Future studies can build on 
prior studies and explore whether a TMT’s informal friendship ties influence the 
diffusion of strategic actions. Further, it will be an interesting research question to 
examine whether board interlocks or executives’ informal friendship ties have more 
influence on diffusion.  
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Next, some scholars have proposed that interlocking directors may also spread 
unethical practices (Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 2010). I have shown support that a 
board interlock can influence the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. One 
interesting question would be whether board interlocks are also good predictors of 
collusive behaviors. Social network theory indicates cohesion fosters similarity (Rice & 
Aydin, 1991); thus, it is possible that unethical practices can diffuse through board 
interlocks. For instance, does board interlock network promote collusive behaviors? 
Scholars have been interested in what factors facilitate collusive behaviors (Hao & Qi, 
2011; Wang, Zhou, & Guan, 2011), and board interlocks may enhance the understanding 
of how collusive behaviors occur. It may be possible that some firms in a clique are 
engaged in collusive behaviors and their financial performance improves as a result of 
the collusive behaviors. Other firms that have board interlocks with the firms may learn 
collusive behaviors through the interlocking directors. The information transferred 
through the interlocking directors may be justified on the basis of improving a firm’s 
performance. As a result, it can be possible that collusive behaviors can be adopted by 
other interlocked firms.  
Having said this, it is also possible that collusive behaviors will be restrained 
when a firm is interlocked with other firms that are not engaged in these collusive 
behaviors. In the example above, the firm that is engaged in collusive behaviors may be 
sanctioned by other firms in the clique. Because a clique is a tightly connected subgroup 
in the network, expectations of conforming to social norms are often developed 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Thus, a firm that deviates from the social norm may be 
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sanctioned. In this vein, the firm engaged in collusive behaviors may eventually adjust 
its unethical practices to be more ethical and acceptable to other interlocked firms in the 
clique. In short, future studies will benefit from examining whether unethical practices 
can be diffused or restrained through board interlocks.   
Given that most interlock studies focused on the diffusion of implementing a 
specific strategic action (e.g., expansion into China), an interesting future study would 
be to examine whether board interlocks facilitate the withdrawal of a strategic action. 
Divestment is an example of the withdrawal of a strategic action. Divestments require a 
firm making decisions to eliminate its existing investment (e.g. closing a subsidiary in a 
foreign country). Divestments can be very costly because of the initial investment and 
the complex logistics that a firm has to follow (Chung, Lee, Beamish, Southam, & Nam, 
2013). In this situation, board interlocks may play a role in terms of facilitating the 
diffusion of divestments. For instance, scholars can investigate whether board interlocks 
influence divestment in emerging markets. Does the focal firm divest its investment in 
the emerging markets following its interlocked firm’s divestment? When does a board 
interlock influence a divestment? In my dissertation, I have shown different level of 
factors can influence diffusion. It will be an interesting future study for scholars to 
examine whether similar types of board interlocks facilitate divestments.  
Finally, another area for future study can be to explore whether firms hire 
directors that are on other firms’ board specifically to enter an emerging market’s 
informal economy. Research has shown that most economic activities occurred in 
emerging markets are in the form of informal economy (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & 
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Sirmon, 2009). As a result, my dissertation only captures a small percentage of the 
economic activities in emerging markets. Given that emerging markets are important 
markets for firms, future studies can explore whether interlocking directors facilitate 
firms to enter the informal economy in the emerging markets. Several future research 
questions can be explored. For instance, do board interlocks facilitate a firm to enter an 
informal economy in an emerging market? Or, do certain firms specifically hire directors 
that are on other firms’ board that have entered an informal economy in an emerging 
market? Questions such as these can be a fruitful area for future research. In summary, I 
believe that there are still many exciting areas that a researcher can explore. 
 
Limitations  
 This dissertation has several limitations. First, many scholars cautioned the 
potential problem of endogeneity. I made an assumption that an interlocking director is 
hired first before s/he transfers the information s/he learns from the interlocked firm to 
the focal firm. Thus, I did not distinguish whether the directors were hired because of 
their specific skills and experiences, or the focal firm gained information transferred 
from the interlocking director. It is very possible that firms do not hire directors at 
random, and they hire the interlocking directors specifically for their knowledge and 
experiences in M&As in emerging markets. In other words, the focal firm may 
strategically hire directors from certain outside firms that have had the experience with 
M&As in emerging markets (Qi, 2010). However, I rely on the theoretical assumptions 
from the social network perspective that information can flow through ties and strategic 
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actions can then be learned and diffused (Borgatti, 2003). In addition, the directors in my 
sample have an average tenure of 6.52 years and I did not observe many new additions 
and exits of interlocking directors. This shows that firms do not constantly hire new 
directors every year in order to learn how to implement a new strategic action. Also, I 
have controlled my analyses to lag my predictors. This means that board interlocks have 
to occur before a focal firm implements M&As in emerging markets. Thus, I have 
designed my study to the best I can to address the question of endogeneity. 
Second, there can be potential problems with my sample. My sample is from 
2001 to 2012, and it is very likely that the focal firm has implemented M&As in 
emerging markets prior to 2001. This is a problem of left censoring. Because I do not 
have board interlock data before 2001, I cannot address this problem fully. Although 
right censoring (firms implementing M&As in emerging markets after the sample 
period) can be addressed by Cox event history analysis model (Allison, 1984), left 
censoring presents a potential problem for researchers given that an event can occur 
before the observation starts. However, I have included a focal firm’s past M&As in the 
BRIC countries as a control variable. Five of my predictors are still positive and 
statistically significant with the focal firm’s past M&As in the BRIC countries as a 
control variable.  
A third limitation is my sample firms. My sample is limited to public firms in the 
S&P 1500, Fortune 1000, and Russell 3000. As a result, I am limited to the 
understanding of the board interlocks among these firms only. It is possible that these 
firms can have board interlocks with firms outside of my sample firms. If the focal firm 
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follows another interlocked firm to implement M&As in emerging markets and the 
interlocked firm is not in my sample, it is not captured in my analysis. Fourth, another 
limitation is the number of observations in my sample. In this dissertation, I define 
M&As in emerging markets as M&As in the BRIC countries in order to control for 
country effects. Ideally, my dissertation should limit to one industry in one country. 
However, I do not have enough observations to conduct such analysis. Having said this, 
by including Brazil, Russia, India, and China as my sample emerging markets, it 
indicates that my results apply for these four countries. On the other hand, my results are 
also limited to the BRIC countries and may or may not be generalizable to other 
emerging markets.  
Further, it is possible that a focal firm’s executives may have had prior 
experiences in emerging markets. For instance, a CEO may have studied in an emerging 
market, for example, Brazil, as a high school exchange student before. His/her 
experience of studying in that specific emerging market is likely to influence the firm’s 
decision to implement M&As there. Thus, the decision to implement M&As in emerging 
markets can be influenced by the executives’ prior experiences in emerging markets. 
Extant research has shown that TMT’s international assignment experience can help a 
firm’s international expansion (Sambharya, 1996). Tihanyi and his colleagues also found 
that TMT’s international experience is positively related to a firm’s international 
diversification (Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton, 2000). Hence, an executive’s 
international experience is likely to influence the implementation of M&As in emerging 
markets. Further, it is worth noting that an executive’s international experience is not 
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limited to work experiences, but can include studying experiences or family reasons 
(e.g., an executive may have relatives in one of the emerging markets). My dissertation 
did not capture the executives’ prior experiences in emerging markets. This can be done 
by surveys for future studies.  
Finally, I have limited my outcome to M&As in emerging markets. By doing so, 
I exclude other activities such as wholly owned subsidiaries or exporting. Furthermore, 
given that a large number of activities in emerging markets are in the informal economy 
(Webb et al., 2009), my dissertation only captures a small percentage of the activities in 
emerging markets. It is possible that a focal firm can follow the interlocked firm into the 
emerging markets, but the focal firm may not necessarily implement M&As. The focal 
firm can engage in activities in the informal economy, or can establish a subsidiary in 
the emerging market. Thus, my dissertation did not capture all possible outcomes. Future 
studies can benefit from examining all possible activities.  
In conclusion, although my dissertation has several limitations, I believe it still 
makes important contributions to the management field. I was able to show that the 
duration of a tie, the number of overlapping cliques, the structural positions of the 
sending board and the receiving board, and the interlocking director’s position as a chair 
influence the diffusion of M&As in emerging markets. These findings suggest that board 
interlocks do matter, but yet there is still much to be explored for future studies on board 
interlocks and the diffusion of strategic actions.  
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE A-1 
 
SELECTIVE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON BOARD INTERLOCKS 
 
Study Journal 
Antecedents 
to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Burt (1979) 
 
SN 
 
Firm Level: 
Cooptation 
 
Firm 
performance 
 
Structural 
theory of 
corporate 
cooptation 
 
Firms are more likely to interlock with firms in 
another industry that constrains their profits. 
Interlocks do not necessarily lead to profits. Only 
firms that are successfully interlocked with those 
sectors that they depend on can obtain the benefits. 
 
Burt (1980) ASQ Firm Level: 
Cooptation 
 Social 
networks 
Cooptive corporate actor network is composed of 
ownership, direct interlocking with other firms, 
and indirect interlocking with other firms through 
financial institutions. These 3 types of relations are 
complementary and are used as cooptive devices. 
 
Burt, Christman, 
& Kilburn 
(1980) 
ASR Firm Level: 
Cooptation 
 Structural 
theory of 
corporate 
cooptation 
 
Interlocks tend to exist when there are market 
constraints and tend to not to occur when market 
constraints are absent. 
Mintz &  
Schwartz (1981) 
ASR Firm Level: 
Cooptation 
 Theory of 
finance 
control 
As predicted by the managerialism theory, modern 
corporations are dominated by interconnected 
commercial banks and insurance companies. 
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TABLE A-1 
 
CONTINUED 
 
Study Journal 
Antecedents 
to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Stearns & 
Mizruchi (1986) 
 
ASQ 
 
Firm Level: 
Cooptation 
  
RDT 
 
The likelihood of direct reconstitution is more 
likely as a result of the sending firm exercising 
power over the receiving firm, while reconstitution 
with another firm in the same industry (functional 
reconstitution) is likely to reflect the absence of 
such power. 
 
Mizruchi & 
Stearns (1988) 
ASQ Firm Level: 
Cooptation 
(financial 
interlocks) 
 RDT Declining solvency, profit rate, and increased 
demand for capital are positively associated with 
the number of representatives from financial 
institutions added to a firm’s board (financial 
directors). 
 
Shrader, 
Hoffman, & 
Stearns (1991) 
JMI Firm Level: 
Cooptation 
(ties to 
resources) 
 
 RDT Strategic relations are important predictors of 
interorganizational centrality. 
Ong, Wan, & 
Ong (2003) 
CGIR Firm Level: 
Cooptation 
(ties to 
resources) 
 RDT and 
bank control 
theory 
They examined factors associated with board 
interlocks.  
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TABLE A-1 
 
CONTINUED 
 
Study Journal 
Antecedents 
to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Galaskiewicz, 
Wasserman, 
Rauschenbach, 
Bielefeld, & 
Mullaney (1985) 
 
 
SF 
 
Firm Level: 
Legitimacy 
and director 
expertise 
  
Organizati-
onal 
theories 
 
Did not find support for cooptation but find that 
firms are more likely to invite high-status CEOs 
on their board.  
Johnson, 
Schnatterly, 
Bolton, & 
Tuggle (2011) 
JMS Individual 
level: Career 
advancement  
 Social 
capital and 
RDT 
Firms with a greater scale and scope of operations 
and those firms that have more high status current 
board members are more likely to attract new 
directors with high social capital. 
 
Mizruchi 
(1990a) 
 
ST Individual 
level: Career 
advancement  
Others 
(similarity of 
behaviors) 
Social 
networks 
Board interlocks are associated but moderately 
with similarity in political behavior. Ties to the 
same financial institutions have a stronger effect.  
 
Koenig & Gogel 
(1981) 
AJES Individual 
level: Social 
Cohesion 
 
 Hegemony 
theory 
Being part of a corporate establishment has a 
significant effect on corporate conduct.  
 
Ornstein (1984) ASQ Individual 
level: Social 
Cohesion 
 Organizati-
onal 
theories 
Board interlocks can be explained by 
interorganizational and class perspectives.  
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TABLE A-1 
 
CONTINUED 
 
Study Journal 
Antecedents 
to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Yue (2012) 
 
OS 
 
Individual 
level: Social 
Cohesion 
 
  
Contact 
theory 
 
Fads and fashions have a strong influence on the 
formation but not the dissolution of networks. 
Bohman (2012) SN Individual 
level: Social 
Cohesion 
 
 Social 
networks 
Results show that there is high association of 
owner network and BOD network. 
Zajac & 
Westphal (1996) 
ASQ Others (boards 
seek directors 
from other 
similar boards 
 Agency 
theory and 
interorgani-
zational 
theory 
 
CEO-board’s variation in power relationships 
contributed to a separation of the director network.  
Kono, Palmer, 
Friedland, & 
Zafonte (1998) 
AJS Others (spatial 
Consideration) 
 Various Interlocks are spatial phenomena because local 
and nonlocal interlocks have different correlates.  
Marquis (2003) ASQ Others 
(imprinting 
theory) 
 
 Imprinting 
theory 
Information flows through director networks may 
be geographically contingent. 
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Study Journal 
Antecedents 
to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Beckman, 
Haunschild, & 
Phillips (2004) 
 
OS 
 
Others 
(environment
- uncertainty 
experienced 
by the firm) 
 
  
Behavioral 
decision 
theory 
 
Interlocks networks are influenced by the type of 
uncertainty experienced by firms. 
Mizruchi, 
Stearns, & 
Marquis (2006) 
ASR Others 
(history) 
Strategy 
diffusion 
Institutional 
theory and 
social 
networks 
 
Interlocks influence corporate financing, but this 
embeddedness is historically contingent. 
Devos, Prevost, 
& 
Puthenpurackal 
(2009) 
FM Others (weak 
performance) 
Firm 
performance 
N/A Interlocks are shown to be indicators of weak 
governance and decrease firm performance. 
Underperforming firms are more likely to have 
interlocking directors. 
 
Clawson & 
Neustadtl (1989) 
AJS  Strategy 
diffusion 
(political 
strategy) 
Organizati-
onal 
theories 
Number of board interlocks influences a firm’s 
political contributions: the higher the number, the 
higher the contribution. 
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CONTINUED 
 
Study Journal 
Antecedents 
to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman 
(1989) 
 
ASQ 
  
Strategy 
diffusion 
(mimic 
behaviors) 
 
Institutional 
theory and 
social 
networks 
 
 
A firm is more likely to give money to non-profits 
when their manager/director sits on the non-
profit’s board. 
Davis (1991) ASQ  Strategy 
diffusion 
(spread of 
poison pills) 
Agency 
theory and 
interorgani-
zational 
theory 
 
Ownership structure and firm-level factors 
influence the spread of poison pills. 
 
Haunschild 
(1993) 
ASQ  Strategy 
diffusion 
RDT, 
financial 
theories and 
agency 
theory 
 
Firms imitated from other interlocked firms on 
acquisition activities. 
 
Davis & Greve 
(1997) 
AJS  Strategy 
diffusion 
Social 
Networks 
Poison pills are diffused through board interlocks 
and golden parachutes are diffused through 
geographic proximity. 
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Study Journal 
Antecedents 
to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Rao, Davis, & 
Ward (2000) 
 
ASQ 
  
Strategy 
diffusion 
 
Social 
networks 
and social 
identity 
theory 
 
Ties to in-group members decreased identity-
discrepant cues and defections; ties to out-group 
members increased identity-discrepant cues and 
defection.  
 
 
Carpenter & 
Westphal (2001) 
AMJ  Strategy 
diffusion 
Agency 
theory 
Directors with relevant strategic knowledge and 
experience increase their involvement and 
monitoring on the board. 
 
Westphal, 
Seidel, & 
Stewart (2001) 
ASQ  Strategy 
diffusion 
Institutional 
theory- 
mimetic 
Firms that are interlocked with other firms are 
likely to imitate their business strategy, acquisition 
activities, and compensation policy.  
 
Sanders & 
Tuschke (2007) 
AMJ  Strategy 
diffusion 
Institutional 
theory 
Board interlocks influence diffusion of 
institutional contested practices. 
Connelly, 
Johnson, 
Tihanyi, 
Ellstrand (2011) 
 
OS  Strategy 
diffusion 
Social 
networks 
Board ties to successful adopters increase adoption 
of expansion into China while ties to unsuccessful 
adopters decreases adoption.  
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Study Journal 
Antecedents 
to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Okhmatovskiy & 
David (2012) 
 
OS 
  
Strategy 
diffusion 
 
Institutional 
theory 
 
Firms are more likely to adopt an internal 
corporate governance code when they are 
interlocked with firms that have implemented an 
internal corporate governance code. 
 
Kang (2008) AMJ  Spread of 
reputation 
Signaling 
and 
attribution 
theories 
Firms are more likely to experience reputational 
penalties when they are interlocked with firms 
accused of financial reporting fraud. 
Richardson 
(1987) 
ASQ  Firm 
performance 
RDT and 
organization
al theories 
Broken ties that are replaced by a similar new tie 
are related to corporate profitability. 
 
Boyd (1990) SMJ  Firm 
performance 
RDT In an environment of uncertainty, a smaller board 
with large number of interlocks performs the best.  
Keister (1998) AJS  Firm 
performance 
Interorgani-
zational 
theory 
 
Board interlocks improved the financial 
performance and productivity. 
Phan, Lee, & 
Lau (2003) 
JMI  Firm 
performance 
RDT Interlocks are positively associated with firm 
performance. 
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Study Journal 
Antecedents 
to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Yeo, Pochet, & 
Alcouffe (2003) 
 
JMG 
  
Firm 
performance 
 
Resource 
dependence 
theory and 
upper 
echelons 
theory 
 
 
CEOs of larger firms hold more reciprocal CEO 
interlocks and there is a positive relationship 
between those interlocks and firm performance. 
Harris & 
Shimizu (2004) 
JMS  Firm 
performance 
(acquisition 
performance) 
RDT Directors that serve on many boards can bring 
knowledge and enhance acquisition performance. 
 
Fich & White 
(2005) 
JCF  Firm 
performance 
N/A Reciprocal CEO interlocks benefits the CEOs but 
not the shareholders. 
Haniffa & 
Hudaib (2006) 
JBFA  Firm 
performance 
Agency 
theory 
Found a significant relationship between board 
interlocks and market performance  
Kiel & 
Nicholson 
(2006) 
CGIR  Firm 
performance 
N/A Multiple directorships and firm financial 
performance have no relationship. 
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to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Sarkar & Sarkar 
(2009) 
 
PBFJ 
  
Firm 
performance 
 
RDT and 
others 
 
Interlocks formed by outside directors are 
positively related to firm performance whereas 
those formed by inside directors are negatively 
related to firm performance. 
 
Pombo & 
Gutierrez (2011) 
JEB  Firm 
performance 
N/A Degree of interlocks is positively associated with 
firm performance. 
Cai & Sevilir 
(2012) 
JFE  Firm 
performance 
Social 
networks 
Direct board interlocks give acquirers lower 
takeover premiums while indirect interlocks give 
acquirers greater value creation.  
 
Horton, Millo, & 
Serafeim (2012) 
JBFA  Firm 
performance 
Social 
capital 
theory 
 
Interlocks are positively associated with a firm’s 
future performance and compensation.  
Palmer (1983) ASQ  Others (formal 
coordination) 
Organizatio
nal theories 
Multiple-interlock ties are more likely to facilitate 
formal coordination than single-interlock ties.  
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Study Journal 
Antecedents 
to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Mizruchi &  
Koenig (1986) 
 
ASR 
  
Others 
 
Organizatio
nal theory 
 
Direct inter-industry interlocks are negatively 
related to political consensus. 
 
Mizruchi & 
Koenig (1988) 
SSR  Others 
(political 
behaviors) 
 
Social 
networks 
Board interlocks are positively associated with 
similarity in political behaviors. 
Mizruchi (1989) AJS  Others Organizati-
onal theory 
Common relations with financial institutions are 
positively associated with the similarity of 
political behavior.  
 
Mizruchi 
(1990a) 
SF  Others 
(political 
opposition) 
Social 
networks 
Different factors, such as Common stockholdings, 
decrease the likelihood of political opposition.  
 
Mizruchi 
(1990b) 
SF2  Others Organizati-
onal theory 
Different factors, such as the presence of board 
interlocks with the same financial institutions, are 
associated with similarity of ideological 
contributions, party contributions, or both. 
 
Palmer, Barber, 
Zhou, & Soysal 
(1995) 
ASR  Others (being 
acquired) 
RDT and 
social 
networks 
Firms run by managers and directors in more 
central positions were less subject to hostile 
takeover. 
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to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Westphal & 
Zajac (1997) 
 
ASQ 
  
Others (board 
control) 
 
Social 
exchange 
theory 
 
Defections from the inner circles are diffused 
through interlocks. 
 
Haunschild & 
Beckman (1998) 
 
ASQ 
  
Others 
(information) 
 
 
RDT 
 
Different factors influence diffusion. 
 
Gulati and 
Westphal (1999) 
ASQ  Others 
(alliance 
formation) 
Social 
networks 
and agency 
theory 
 
Third-party network ties influence direct interlock 
ties. 
Geletkanycz,  
Boyd, & 
Finkelstein 
(2001) 
 
SMJ  Others (CEO 
compensation) 
RDT and 
social 
networks 
A firm’s level of diversification can influence the 
rewards to CEO’s external directorate networks. 
Beckman & 
Haunschild 
(2002) 
ASQ  Others 
(acquisitions) 
Upper-
echelons 
theory 
Firms tied to other firms with heterogeneous 
experiences benefits more than those tied to others 
with homogeneous experience. 
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Study Journal 
Antecedents 
to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
from 
Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Burris (2005) 
 
AJS 
  
Others 
(similarity in 
political 
behaviors) 
 
Pluralist 
theory and 
class 
cohesion 
theory 
 
 
Similarity of political behavior can be predicted by 
the ties formed via common membership on 
boards. 
Ruigrok, Peck, 
& Keller (2006)  
JMS  Others (board 
involvement) 
Agency 
theory and 
social 
networks 
Board involvement in strategic decision making is 
generally lower where boards have many 
interlocks and same-industry interlocks. 
Rosenkopf, & 
Schleicher 
(2008) 
MDE  Others 
(Alliance 
formation) 
 
RDT Interlocks facilitate alliance formation. 
 
Haynes & 
Hillman (2010) 
SMJ  Others 
(strategic 
change) 
RDT Board interlocks influence strategic change. 
 
Valenti & 
Horner (2010) 
JABE  Others 
(monitoring) 
Social 
networks 
Did not support the proposition that board 
centrality predicts governance effectiveness.  
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to Interlocks 
Outcomes 
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Interlocks 
Theories Key findings 
 
Dreiling & 
Darves (2011) 
 
AJS 
  
Others 
(political 
unity) 
 
 
Social 
networks 
 
Board interlocks are positively associated with 
corporate political similarity. 
 
Mahmood, Zhu, 
& Zajac (2011) 
SMJ  Others 
(capabilities) 
Social 
networks 
A firm’s multiplex network ties are an important 
source of capability acquisition.  
 
Moore, Bell, 
Filatotchev & 
Rasheed (2012) 
SMJ  Others (foreign 
capital market 
choice) 
Institutional 
theory 
Internal governance characteristics and external 
network characteristics are predictors of foreign 
capital market choice.  
 
 
1 
Journal abbreviations: AJES: American Journal of Economics and Sociology; AJS: American Journal of Sociology; AMJ: Academy of Management Journal; AMR: Academy of 
Management Review; ASQ: Administrative Science Quarterly; ASR: American Sociological Review; CGIR: Corporate Governance: An International Review; FM: Financial Management; 
JABE: Journal of Applied Business and Economics; JBFA: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting; JCF: Journal of Corporate Finance; JEB: Journal of Economics and Business; JFE: 
Journal of Financial Economics; JMG: Journal of Management and Governance; JMI: Journal of Management Issues; JMS: Journal of Management Studies; JOM: Journal of Management; 
MDE: Managerial and Decision Economics; OS: Organization Science; PBFJ: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal; SF: Social Forces; SF2: Sociological Forum; SMJ: Strategic Management 
Journal; SN: Social Networks; SSR: Social Science Research; ST: Sociological Theory;  
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TABLE A-2 
 
NUMBER OF M&AS IN BRIC COUNTRIES EACH YEAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Not in 
BRIC  
In 
BRIC 
Total 
2001 1,937 65 2,002 
2002 1,777 40 1,817 
2003 1,756 70 1,826 
2004 1,984 89 2,073 
2005 2,193 94 2,287 
2006 2,348 117 2,465 
2007 2,465 136 2,601 
2008 2,162 151 2,313 
2009 1,344 82 1,426 
2010 1,799 91 1,890 
2011 1,925 124 2,049 
2012 1,929 96 2,025 
Total 4,025 1,431 5,456 
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TABLE A-3 
 
SUMMARY OF VARIABLES 
 
Variable Definitions Data Source 
 
Dependent Variable 
  
Rate of occurrence from one firm to 
another 
Two variables: the first is an integer variable measuring 
the year. The second is a dummy variable showing 
whether the focal firm has implemented M&As in one or 
more BRIC countries one year after the interlocked firm 
has implemented them. 1 is year and 0 is no. I excluded 
M&As that were incomplete or were repurchases.  
Thompson One 
 
Independent Variables 
  
Duration of an interlock Length of the interlock in years. In the case of more than 
one interlock, I took the longest duration. 
Corporate Library 
Closed triad Dummy=1 if both firms are in a closed triad, 0 
otherwise. 
Corporate Library 
Number of cliques The number of cliques that both firms are in, measured 
by 2-clan. 
Corporate Library 
Sending board’s influence Measured by normalized Eigenvector centrality.  Corporate Library 
Receiving board’s access to 
information 
Measured by normalized closeness centrality.  Corporate Library 
Chair on either board Dummy=1 if an interlocking director is also a chair in 
either firms, 0 otherwise. 
Corporate Library 
Director tenure on receiving board Length of time an interlocking director has served on the 
reviving board, measured in years. 
Corporate Library 
Director ownership in focal firm Percentage of ownership the interlocking director has 
over the firm. 
Corporate Library 
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TABLE A-3 
 
CONTINUED 
 
Variable Definitions Data Source 
 
Control Variables 
 
 
 
Size Natural logarithm of total employees. COMPUSTAT 
ROS Firm performance using return on sales. COMPUSTAT 
Leverage Debt divided by sales. COMPUSTAT 
Past BRIC Dummy=1 if the focal firm has implemented M&As in 
one (or more) of the BRIC countries in the past 5 year. 
Thompson One 
Total M&As Number of M&As in a given year for the focal firm. Thompson One 
Receiving board size Number of board members the receiving board has. Corporate Library 
Industry M&As Mean occurrence of M&As in one (or more) of the BRIC 
countries for firms in the same two-digit SIC. 
COMPUSTAT &  
Thompson One 
M&A Size Natural log of the value of the M&A in million US 
dollars. 
Thompson One 
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TABLE A-4 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND INTERCORRELATIONS 
 
 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Rate of occurance 0.10 0.31
2. Size 2.86 1.57 0.08
3. ROS 0.07 0.30 0.00 -0.01
4. Leverage 0.20 0.80 0.11 0.14 -0.10
5. Past BRIC 0.10 0.30 0.34 0.22 0.03 0.17
6. Total M&As 2.26 1.81 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.12
7. Receiving board size 10.82 2.40 0.02 0.46 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.00
8. Industry M&As 0.09 0.08 0.19 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.07
9. M&A size 3.43 1.57 -0.22 -0.16 0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.07 -0.08 -0.25
10. Duration of an interlock 4.85 4.83 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.09
11. Closed triad 0.65 0.48 0.16 0.32 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.21 0.21 -0.32 0.05
12. Number of cliques 4.52 4.25 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.11 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.26
13. Sending board’s influence 5.92 5.99 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.21 0.14 -0.26 0.06 0.23 0.20
14. Receiving board’s access to information 9.61 10.39 -0.24 -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.09 0.05 -0.31 0.76 -0.12 -0.34 0.11 -0.20
15. Chair on either board 0.19 0.39 0.07 0.10 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.11 -0.20 0.05 0.10 -0.06 0.09 -0.23
16. Director tenure on receiving board 6.52 6.39 0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.10 -0.23 0.21 0.11 0.01 0.10 -0.29 0.16
17. Director ownership in focal firm 6.21 10.09 -0.17 -0.23 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.21 0.55 0.12 -0.28 0.04 -0.20 0.33 -0.07 -0.01
Variable
 
 
1 
N=5,976 
2 
Correlations >|.03| are significant at p <.05
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TABLE A-5 
 
VIF FOR MODEL 2 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Receiving board’s access to information 3.87 0.258583 
Director tenure on receiving board 3.21 0.311780 
Duration of an interlock 2.99 0.334380 
M&A size 2.61 0.382738 
Director ownership in focal firm 2.01 0.496364 
Closed triad 1.99 0.502849 
Sending board’s influence 1.74 0.573806 
Size 1.52 0.658436 
Receiving board size 1.35 0.740539 
Industry M&As 1.16 0.863248 
Number of cliques 1.14 0.873416 
Past BRIC 1.14 0.873482 
Chair on either board 1.11 0.897546 
Leverage 1.10 0.908044 
Total M&As 1.04 0.960165 
ROS 1.02 0.982655 
Mean VIF 1.81  
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TABLE A-6 
 
COX MODEL EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DIFFUSION OF M&AS IN THE BRIC COUNTRIES 
 
COEFFICIENTS ARE ODDS RATIOS 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Controls   
Size 1.03 0.95 
ROS 0.89† 0.96 
Leverage 1.03 1.06 
Past BRIC 1.39*** 1.54*** 
Total M&As 1.16*** 1.25*** 
Receiving board size 0.90*** 0.95* 
Industry M&As 1.11*** 1.05** 
M&A size 0.96*** 0.97*** 
   
Predictors   
Duration of an interlock  1.09*** 
Closed triad  1.01 
Number of cliques  1.30** 
Sending board’s influence  1.02* 
Receiving board’s access to information  0.91*** 
Chair on either board  1.23* 
Director tenure on receiving board  0.97* 
Director ownership in focal firm  0.98 
Log Likelihood -3018.8931 -2893.3819 
Chi-Square     462.58*** 900.84*** 
   
 
1 All variables are lagged by one year 
2 † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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TABLE A-7 
 
VIF FOR MODEL 3 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Receiving board’s access to information 3.85 0.260030 
Director tenure on receiving board 3.21 0.311511 
Director ownership in focal firm 3.12 0.320880 
Duration of an interlock 2.99 0.334266 
M&A size 2.62 0.381627 
Closed triad (number of Simmelian ties) 2.40 0.416865 
Number of cliques 2.13 0.468926 
Director ownership in focal firm (squared) 2.03 0.491467 
Size 1.49 0.670065 
Sending board’s influence 1.35 0.741020 
Receiving board size 1.35 0.741836 
Industry M&As 1.15 0.869704 
Past BRIC 1.15 0.873254 
Chair on either board 1.11 0.897074 
Leverage 1.10 0.907729 
Total M&As 1.04 0.959914 
ROS 1.02 0.982766 
Mean VIF      1.95  
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TABLE A-8 
 
VIF FOR MODEL 4 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Closed triad (number of Simmelian ties) 8.82 0.113379 
Closed triad (number of Simmelian ties, 
squared) 
7.65 0.130719 
Number of cliques 5.53 0.180868 
Receiving board’s access to information 3.85 0.259731 
Director tenure on receiving board 3.21 0.311051 
Director ownership in focal firm 3.12 0.320837 
Duration of an interlock 2.99 0.334094 
M&A size 2.62 0.381532 
Director ownership in focal firm (squared) 2.03 0.491465 
Size 1.49 0.670065 
Sending board’s influence 1.35 0.739442 
Receiving board size 1.35 0.741740 
Industry M&As 1.15 0.869518 
Past BRIC 1.15 0.873202 
Chair on either board 1.12 0.895723 
Leverage 1.10 0.907538 
Total M&As 1.04 0.958596 
ROS 1.02 0.982700 
Mean VIF      2.81  
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TABLE A-9 
 
POST HOC ANALYSES: COX MODEL EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DIFFUSION OF M&AS IN THE BRIC COUNTRIES 
 
COEFFICIENTS ARE ODDS RATIOS 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Controls     
Size 1.03 0.95 0.95 0.95 
ROS 0.89† 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Leverage 1.03 1.06 1.06 1.06 
Past BRIC 1.39*** 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.54*** 
Total M&As 1.16*** 1.25*** 1.25*** 1.25*** 
Receiving board size 0.90*** 0.95* 0.95* 0.95* 
Industry M&As 1.11*** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 
M&A size 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 
     
Predictors     
Duration of an interlock  1.09*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 
Closed triada  1.01 1.01 1.31 
Closed triad (Squared)b    0.94 
Number of cliques  1.30** 1.30† 1.04 
Sending board’s influence  1.02* 1.02** 1.02** 
Receiving board’s access to 
information 
 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 
Chair on either board  1.23* 1.23* 1.24** 
Director tenure on receiving 
board 
 0.97* 0.97* 0.97* 
Director ownership in focal firm  0.98 0.97† 0.97† 
Director ownership in focal firm 
(Squared) 
  1.00 1.00 
Log Likelihood -3018.8931 -2893.3819 -2892.6206 -2892.1131 
Wald Chi-Square 462.58*** 900.84*** 906.56*** 922.37*** 
 
1 All variables are lagged by one year 
2 † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
a In model 3 and 4, Closed Triad is the number of Simmelian ties  
b In Model 4,Closed Triad (Squared) is a squared term of the number of Simmelian ties 
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TABLE A-10 
 
SENSITIVITY TESTS: COX MODEL EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DIFFUSION OF M&AS IN THE BRIC COUNTRIES 
 
COEFFICIENTS ARE ODDS RATIOS 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 5a Model 6b 
Controls     
Size 1.03 0.95 1.09 1.18* 
ROS 0.89† 0.96 1.09 0.63 
Leverage 1.03 1.06 1.15* 1.17† 
Past BRIC 1.39*** 1.54*** 1.03 1.16** 
Total M&As 1.16*** 1.25*** 0.89 0.90 
Receiving board size 0.90*** 0.95* 0.90** 0.86** 
Industry M&As 1.11*** 1.05** 1.07** 1.08** 
M&A size 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.77*** 0.92*** 
     
Predictors     
Duration of an interlock  1.09*** 1.12*** 1.16*** 
Closed triad  1.01 1.03 1.03 
Number of cliques  1.30** 1.04 1.27 
Sending board’s influence  1.02* 1.18*** 1.16*** 
Receiving board’s access to 
information 
 0.91*** 0.84*** 0.23 
Chair on either board  1.23* 1.09 1.47 
Director tenure on receiving 
board 
 0.97* 0.97 0.96 
Director ownership in focal firm  0.98 1.02 1.03 
Log Likelihood -3018.8931 -2893.3819 -1160.5400 -665.2448 
Wald Chi-Square 462.58*** 900.84*** 175.42*** 347.91*** 
 
1 All variables are lagged by one year except Model 5 and 6 
2 † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
a In model 5, all variables are lagged by 2 years 
b In Model 6, all variables are lagged by 3 years 
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FIGURE A-1 
 
A CLOSED TRIAD 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Firm B 
Firm A Firm C 
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FIGURE A-2 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dyad Level 
(+) Duration of an interlock (H1) 
 
 
 
M&As in Emerging 
Markets 
Interlocking Director 
(+) Chair on either board (H6) 
(+) Director’s tenure on receiving board (H7) 
(+) Director’s ownership in focal firm (H8) 
 
 
Structural Level 
(+) Closed triad (H2) 
(+) Number of cliques (H3) 
(+) Sending board’s influence (H4) 
(-) Receiving board’s access to information (H5) 
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APPENDIX B 
A DESCRIPTION OF CLIQUES 
 
It is important to note that though a traditional definition of a clique is a maximal 
fully-connected subgraph (everyone is connected to everyone), social network 
researchers have applied a more relaxing and general definition (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994). Thus, following the current development in social network theory, I define a 
clique as an N-clique, meaning that actors are within the reach of N steps (e.g., N 
interlocking directors). An example of two 2-cliques is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
  
AN EXAMPLE OF TWO 2-CLIQUES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm B 
Firm A Firm C 
Director A Director B 
Firm D 
Director C Director D 
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  Represents a tie between a firm and a director 
  Represents a tie between two firms 
 
  
In the figure above, Firm A and Firm C are connected through a common 
director (Director A). In this example, Firm C is the focal firm and Firm A is the 
interlocked firm. Firm A is also connected with Firm B through Director A, and then 
Firm B is connected with Firm C through Director B. As a result, Firm A and Firm C are 
in a 2-clique. On the other hand, they are also in another 2-clique with Firm D. In this 
example, we can say that Firm A and Firm C are in two 2-cliques together. Based on a 
top-down approach from prior studies (Chan & Liebowitz, 2006; Wellman, 1983), I 
examined the board interlock network as a whole and identify the sub-structures that are 
more dense and commonly in the network. From there, cliques were identified. This 
approach allows researchers to operate at a network level and focus on the constraints of 
the network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).   
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APPENDIX C 
FOUR MOST COMMONLY USED CENTRALITY CONSTRUCTS 
 
  
There are different constructs of centrality in social network analysis. Depending 
on the underlying assumption (e.g., what do scholars consider to be important or 
central), different constructs yield different results. For instance, if a researcher is only 
concerned about the direct ties, then degree centrality is a good measure to capture 
centrality. However, if a researcher is concerned about all ties in a network, then degree 
centrality may not necessarily reflect the position because it does not take into 
consideration other indirect ties. There are four commonly used centrality measures in 
social network analysis: degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). I will briefly explain the differences below:  
 
Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality is the most widely used centrality measure (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994) and is defined as the number of direct ties an actor has. For instance, if 
Firm A is interlocked with 5 other firms, then Firm A has a degree centrality of 5. In 
degree centrality, the ties that the other 5 firms have are of no concern to Firm A in 
degree centrality. It is simply a count of the ties an actor has.  
 
Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality measures the number of times an actor serves as a bridge  
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between two actors along the shortest path. It mainly reflects an assumption of 
controlling the flow of communications/ information (Freeman, 1977). An actor with 
high betweenness centrality serves as a bridge that can potentially reap the benefits of 
being the “go between” person. It can be thought of being a broker (Burt, 1995). In 
essence, an actor with high betweenness centrality is especially useful in economic 
transactions because they hold the keys to information and are able to control the flow 
for their own benefit.  
 
Closeness Centrality 
 Closeness centrality measures the sum of distance to all other actors. Because it 
is the sum, a high number in closeness centrality actually denotes a less central actor, 
and thus, the raw number really means “farness” (Borgatti, 2005). In other words, the 
more central an actor is, the lower number its sum of total distance to all other actor. It 
can be regarded as the likelihood of an actor to receive information from all other actors 
in the network. For instance, if an actor has a low raw number of closeness centrality, it 
means that information can reach this actor relatively fast because it is close to all other 
actors in the network.  
 
Eigenvector Centrality 
 Eigenvector centrality is commonly referred to measure the influence of an actor 
(Bonacich, 1972). It assigns scores to each actor relative to its position. In other words, a 
tie to a well-connected actor weighs more than a tie to a less-connected actor. It is 
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fundamentally different than other centrality measures because the assumption is that 
every tie is different. Thus, a tie is not just a tie; it depends on who an actor is tie to.  
